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ABSTRACT 
 
MILITARY AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY AND ALGERIA: THE SUCCESS 
OR FAILURE OF THE EU'S MEDITERRANEAN POLICY 
 
Ayşe Aslıhan Çelenk 
M.A., Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Dr. Aylin Güney 
September 2003 
This thesis analyzes the relationship between the militaries and 
democratization in Algeria and Turkey within the context of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership. Turkey and Algeria are the two countries which have a history of 
military's involvement in politics and whose armies are in an important position in 
terms of their political influence. In the thesis, the military-democracy relationship in 
Turkey and Algeria is incorporated into the framework of Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership and the impacts of the Mediterranean policy of the EU over this 
relationship are analyzed by dealing with its basic premises, strengths and 
weaknesses in terms of promoting the establishment of democratic control over the 
militaries in the region. 
Key Words: Military, Democracy, Democratic control of the armed forces, Turkey, 
Algeria, EU, EUROMED. 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE VE CEZAYİR'DE ORDU-DEMOKRASİ İLİŞKİSİ: AB'NİN AKDENİZ 
POLİTİKASININ BAŞARI YA DA BAŞARISIZLIĞI? 
 
Ayşe Aslıhan Çelenk 
Master, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Aylin Güney 
Eylül 2003 
Bu tez, Avrupa Birliği-Akdeniz Ortaklığı çerçevesinde Türkiye ve Cezayir'de 
ordu-demokrasi ilişkisini incelemektedir. Türkiye ve Cezayir, ordunun siyasete 
müdahalesinin ve ordunun politik bir aktör olarak hareket etmesinin 
gözlemlenebildiği iki ülkedir ve bu tezde; iki ülkedeki ordu-siyaset ve ordu-
demokratikleşme ilişkisi AB-Akdeniz ortaklığı ışığında ele alınmakta ve AB'nin 
Akdeniz politikasının bu ilişkiler üzerindki etkileri açıklanmaktadır. 
Bu tezin yazılmasındaki amaç; AB'nin Türkiye ile Cezayir'deki ordu-siyaset 
ilişkisine bakışını karşılaştırmak ve AB'nin Akdeniz politikasının ana hatlarını, etkili 
olduğu alanları, başarı ve başarısızlıklarını saptamaktır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ordu, Demokrasi, Ordunun demokratik kontrolü, Türkiye, 
Cezayir, Avrupa Birliği, AB-Akdeniz Ortaklığı. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Today, democracy is mostly accepted as the ideal form of government and as 
a means of establishing a secure and peaceful environment in the world. The newly 
emerging understanding of security among the states which makes democratization 
and promotion of democracy a foreign policy tool, is influential in the way in which 
the international relations are conducted and it also reflects itself upon the way in 
which the supranational organizations are formed and upon their basic premises and 
the European Union is an important test case for analyzing the promotion of 
democracy as a policy tool because of the way in which the importance of 
democracy is stressed by the EU headquarters, in the declarations and official 
documents. 
 The concept ‘democratization' can be analyzed from various perspectives by 
using different variables. In this thesis, the democratization policy of the EU is 
analyzed in relation to the militaries in terms of establishing the democratic control 
of the armed forces. In other words, the civilian control over the power and 
responsibilities of the militaries is assumed to be an integral part of the overall 
democratization of a given country and this assumption is tried to be combined with 
the policy of promoting democracy within the framework of the EU. 
 In this context, the individual countries chosen for the analysis of the 
military-democracy relationship are Turkey and Algeria and these country analyses 
are combined with the impacts of the EU's Mediterranean policy in which the 
promotion of democracy in the region plays an important role. The reason for 
choosing these two countries is the fact that both Turkey and Algeria have militaries, 
which are politicized to a certain extent in the sense that both Turkish and Algerian 
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armies have a history of intervention to the politics and are political actors in their 
countries. In addition to this, taking Turkey and Algeria as cases for studying the 
military-democracy relationship and the impacts of the EU over this relationship 
provides a basis for analyzing the essence of the Mediterranean policy of the EU and 
for determining whether this policy is a consistent one or not and the successes and 
deficiencies of this policy as both countries are the Mediterranean Partners of the 
EU. However, at this point, it should be noted that, although Turkey and Algeria 
provide a common ground for the analysis of the EU’s Mediterranean policy, these 
two countries are two different levels of analysis. Turkey is a country which is on the 
membership track, while Algeria is an associate country of the EU. Throughout the 
thesis, this difference of position between these two countries will be emphasized 
and the EU’s policies will be evaluated according to this difference. 
 The aim of the thesis is to give an account of the military-democratization 
relationship in Turkey and Algeria and to determine the impact of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership over this relationship. In order to give the whole account 
of this issue, various questions are asked and tried to be answered in the thesis. The 
thesis explores the implications of the importance of democracy for the EU over the 
foreign policy of the Union and over the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which can 
be regarded as an aspect of the EU's foreign policy. Then, the civilian-military 
relations and democratization problems in Turkey and Algeria are evaluated in the 
context of the EU's policies and the interaction between the individual cases and the 
EUROMED is explored in order to draw some conclusions about the character of the 
Mediterranean Policy of the EU. 
 The first chapter of the thesis deals with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EUROMED), which is the official framework of the Mediterranean policy of the 
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EU. In order to facilitate the analysis of the military-democracy problematique in the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, first, the chapter explores the context which made 
democracy of strategic importance for the EU and its impacts over the Mediterranean 
region. Then, the basic character of the EU’s Mediterranean policy is explored in 
relation to the second and third waves of enlargement which made the Mediterranean 
region the backdoor of the EU. The chapter makes a comparison of the past and 
present policies of the EU in the region and analyses the significance of the 
democratic control of the militaries in these policies and under the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy of the EU in order to clarify the policies of the EU towards the 
individual Mediterranean Partners, two of which are Turkey and Algeria. 
 The case studies of Turkey and Algeria in terms of the military-democracy 
relationship constitute the second and third chapters of the thesis. In these chapters, 
for both countries, first the context, which led to the politicization of the armies, is 
analyzed and then the significance of this situation in relation to the EU is explored. 
The third chapter also contains the comparison of the EU's policies towards the 
civilian-military relations in these two countries in order to determine whether the 
EU has a consistent Mediterranean policy in terms of promoting democracy in the 
region or not and in order to illustrate the different positions of the two countries in 
their relations to the EU. 
 In the conclusion part, the questions asked about the importance of the 
promotion of democracy within the EU framework, its implications over the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership in terms of affecting the military-democratization 
relationship in the region and the basic features of the Mediterranean policy of the 
EU are revisited and tried to be answered. The thesis is finalized with some 
conclusive remarks about the successes and failures of the EU's Mediterranean 
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policy in terms of helping to establish the democratic control of the militaries in the 
Mediterranean Partners and some remarks about promoting democracy in the future, 
as a policy tool in the EU-Mediterranean relations. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE MILITARIES AND 
THE MEDITERRANEAN POLICY OF THE EU 
 
 The Mediterranean region is one of the areas which are of strategic 
importance for the European Union. The second and third waves of enlargement 
of the Community, which included Greece, Spain and Portugal, made the EC a 
neighbor of the region and the security interests of the new Southern members 
required a specific Mediterranean policy for the Community. The Mediterranean 
policy of the EU is a multi-dimensional one and this chapter deals with this 
policy in terms of promoting the establishment of the democratic control over 
the militaries in the region. 
 In this chapter, the first Southern enlargement of the EU including Greece, 
Spain and Portugal and its implications over current Mediterranean policy of the 
EU will be explored and the importance of the promotion of democracy in the 
region and the role of the democratic control of the militaries for 
democratization will be analyzed within the context of first the EUROMED and 
then the CFSP which is the general framework of the EU's foreign policy. 
 However, in order to make the analysis of the past and present 
Mediterranean policies of the EU in terms of promoting democracy and 
establishing the democratic control over the militaries, first, we need to 
understand the context that led to the current importance of democracy in the 
domestic and foreign policy of the EU. For this reason, before analyzing the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the chapter begins with a brief historical 
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account of the formation of the European Community and of the conditions 
which made the promotion of democracy a policy tool in the EU. 
 
1.1 Europe in Search For Peace 
  In the twentieth century, the European states suffered from two devastating 
world wars. After the First World War, a lasting peace system could not be 
established in the continent and the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany and the 
expansionist policies of its leader Hitler led to the outbreak of the Second World 
War, which lasted, between 1939 and 1945. This second war taught the 
Europeans that they had to establish such a system for the interaction among 
themselves that it would prevent the occurrence of another war and more 
destruction throughout the continent. 
 When the war ended, a new world order emerged which led to a bipolar 
power structure with the United States on one hand and the Soviet Union on the 
other. This division reflected a conflict between the democratic regimes and the 
communist regimes that took the form of a cold war and Europe had to place 
itself appropriately within that structure. As a result of this polarization, Europe 
was also divided into two parts according to the regime types as the democratic 
Western Europe and the communist Eastern Europe, which soon became known 
as the satellites of the Soviet Union.  
 
1.2 The Origins of the European Community 
 The desire to establish a lasting peace system triggered some sort of 
cooperation and union among the European states, which would make it harder  
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to engage in conflicts for them. However, the idea of a union did not come out 
of the blue over night. As Winston Churchill stated in his famous speech "The 
Tragedy of Europe" in Zurich University on September 19, 1946, the initial 
desire was to form a partnership between France and Germany in order to 
prevent a Franco-German war. In his speech, Churchill stated that "Europe had 
to unite before war destroyed the continent and its civilization"(1974) and he 
called for a United States of Europe which had to be led by France and Germany 
who were long-term rivals. It was expected that the peace between these two 
countries would contribute to the peace and security of the whole continent. 
Thus, the starting point of today's European Union was the desire to moderate 
the conflict between France and Germany in order to prevent the occurrence of 
another intra-European war (Arter, 1993: 127). 
 In addition to the desire to incorporate Germany into Europe for preventing 
the recurrence of war, within the polarized world order led by the United States 
and the Soviet Union, the smaller states had a fear of threat of the domination of 
these two super powers and they were searching for economic resources for the 
post-war reconstruction of Europe (Wegs, 1991:150). In this context, forming a 
union could both give Europe an identity and strength in the international 
politics and provide economic advantages and support for each state in addition 
to decreasing the possibility of emergence of another war. Certain concrete steps 
were taken towards forming a unified Europe right after the war for an 
immediate peaceful settlement in Europe and at this point, it can be useful to 
give some examples in order to clarify the post-war political situation in Europe. 
  In 1947, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 
was formed for economic purposes of distributing US financial aid for the 
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reconstruction of Europe under the Marshall Plan and the promotion of trade in 
Europe. After the foundation of the OEEC, there emerged a desire for further 
ties between the European states and in order to determine the possible 
strategies for political and economic cooperation, the Council of Europe was 
established in 1948 and during 1950s, "the unstable international situation, the 
re-emergence of the German state, ongoing Cold War, the outbreak of the 
Korean War and US demands for rearming Germany created pressure for 
integration"(Wegs, 1991: 153) and in 1952, the first step of the European 
integration was taken with the establishment of European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) which bound France and Germany together with Italy, 
Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg- or the Benelux- by pooling of the coal 
and steel resources of each country in a single hand and these countries later 
became the original six of the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC 
was established in 1955 as a result of the success of the ECSC and aimed to 
create a common market for the industrial and agricultural products in Europe 
through the elimination of customs barriers. 
 These organizations were the major peace settlement efforts in Europe in 
the early post-war years and as it can be seen, they were mainly initiated for 
economic rather than political cooperation. However, the initial economic 
cooperation among the European states after the Second World War had 
political and security implications for today's EU and by using the basic 
premises of the functionalist approach, it is possible to explain the process 
which made democracy a part of the political understanding within the EU.  
  
 
 9 
1.3 The Function of the Economic Integration: A More Democratic 
Europe? 
 The functionalist explanation of the European integration stems from the 
famous book of David Mitrany (1966); "A Working Peace System", where the 
main aim of Mitrany was to develop ideas that could help to make the war 
impossible and to achieve a working peace system. According to Mitrany's 
theory, coordination among the states along technical lines, i.e. the low politics, 
will generate cooperation in other areas and as the number of these functional 
agencies increases, the states will become more interdependent and eventually a 
political agency will be created to supervise the deeper cooperation among the 
states. According to Mitrany (1966), various functional agencies can play an 
important role in the wide understanding of security as when the cooperation 
begins with the economy and spreads to the other areas of policy making, the 
states become more dependent on each other and the war itself becomes a threat 
for their interests. 
 Today's EU can be regarded as a supranational body which is the result of 
the evolution of the functional cooperation among the European states. As 
indicated above, the European integration began in the form of economic 
cooperation and now it has come to the point where a European Constitution is 
being prepared for the conduct of relations and policies. In this context, we can 
regard the promotion of democracy within the EU and abroad as an outcome of 
the deepening of integration and as a way of conducting the rules of integration 
and provide a common ground for further integration. 
 As Jean Monnet stated in his article "A Ferment of Change" that appeared 
in the Journal of Common Market Studies (1962: 203-211), for peaceful 
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international relations, nations had to adopt common rules governing their 
behavior and create common institutions to apply these rules and in the 
European Union case, the common ground for the inter-state relations was 
democracy and while forming the institutions of the community and shaping its 
policies and rules, the concept of democracy has always been a key issue and it 
is still important in the debates about the EU institutions, policies and its 
relations with the member and candidate countries. 
 In the last thirty years there has been a trend towards democracy in Europe 
especially with the disappearance of the dictatorships in Spain, Greece and 
Portugal, the collapse of communism and the popularity of the market economy 
and this democratic revival in Europe is mostly visible in how the EU evaluates 
the potential candidates and how it designs its relations with the third parties. 
Thus, the level of democratization in these countries is a significant criterion for 
accepting them as EU members and for carrying out the economic and political 
relations. 
Although the necessity of being a democratic state for gaining EU 
membership has been stated in various previously mentioned treaties, summits, 
conferences and the like, it is the Copenhagen European Council of 1993 which 
formalized democracy as one of the political criteria of membership. In this 
council meeting, the member states designed the membership criteria, which are 
now known as the Copenhagen Criteria, and it was stated that "the accession 
would take place as soon as an applicant is able to assume the obligations of 
membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required"1. 
According to the Copenhagen Criteria: 
                                                 
1 Taken from the official site for EU ENLARGEMENT, 
europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm  
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"Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for the protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning 
market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure 
and market forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of 
membership including the adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union; and the conditions for its integration through the 
adjustment of the administrative structures, so that the European 
Community legislation transposed into national legislations implemented 
effectively through the appropriate administrative and judicial structures."2 
 
 After 1993, these criteria have been the basis for the assessment of the 
candidate countries that would like to join the EU and the Commission began to 
submit regular reports on the progress achieved by each candidate country 
regarding the Copenhagen Criteria which form the basis for the negotiations 
between the EU and these countries.  
 The enlargement of the EU is towards two directions. One is towards the 
formerly communist, Eastern European countries and the other is towards the 
Southern Europe or the Mediterranean region. In the approach of the EU 
towards the candidates in these regions, the political criterion is basically how 
democratic they are and the level of democracy is assessed according to certain 
conditions. 
  The Eastern European candidates, having fulfilled the democratic criteria, 
have gained the right to membership recently. However, there are still some 
concerns about the democratization level in the Mediterranean region and the 
EU's Mediterranean policy, which will be discussed in detail in the following 
sections, is based on these concerns about the region. In the context of this 
policy, various initiatives are taken by the EU and these policies enable one to 
analyze the democracy-military relationship as the lack of democratic control 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
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over the militaries is assumed to be an obstacle against the democratization of 
the Mediterranean region. 
 
1.4 The Pre-condition of Democracy and the Militaries: An Introduction to 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
 
 The role of the militaries is important for the democratization of a country 
and in the European Union case, it has a special importance because the idea of 
the EU emerged out of the desire to prevent a potential military threat and to 
control the military. In order to prevent war and to settle the disputes peacefully, 
military should be controlled through democratic means by the decision-makers. 
For this reason, a state in which the institution of army has a political role or 
shapes the state policies is an undemocratic one for the EU. The Mediterranean 
region consists of countries in which military plays a strong role in politics and 
that is why in the EU-Mediterranean relations, the political role of the military is 
a source of debate and as it will be discussed in the following sections, the 
relationship between the militaries and democracy in the Mediterranean region 
is a crucial aspect of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED). 
In order to understand the importance of the militaries with respect to the 
issue of democratization for the Mediterranean partners of the EU, it could be 
useful to examine the first Mediterranean enlargement or the second and third 
waves of enlargement of the European Union which included Greece, Spain and 
Portugal. The reason for starting with these three countries is the fact that the 
enlargement processes of these countries were the periods during which the 
democratization problem of the potential members came into agenda and which 
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shaped the attitude of the EU towards the future applications for membership 
coming from the Mediterranean region and the nature of the relationships 
between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. For this reason, the rest of the 
chapter deals with the second and third waves of enlargement of the EU and the 
emergence of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership which will be the context of 
the analysis of the political role played by the militaries in the Mediterranean 
countries and its effects over the EU's Mediterranean policy and the debates 
about the issue of democratization. 
 
1.5 The Second and Third Waves of Enlargement 
 The possibility of a Southern enlargement for the European Union came into 
agenda with the application of Greece for joining the EC for the first time. Greece 
has applied for signing an association agreement with the EC in 1959 and this 
agreement was signed in 1961. Between the years 1967 and 1974, Greece was 
governed by a military regime and during this period the EC has suspended the 
association agreement with Greece. This suspension of the agreement can be 
considered as a sign of the importance given to the limitation of the political power 
of the military and the desire to keep the military under the control of the democratic 
civilian authority as while the military authority was in power in Greece, the EC has 
given a reaction to this situation by the suspension of the association agreement and 
did not want to engage in relationships with an undemocratic military authority. In 
short, by suspending the agreement, the EC has created a sort of sanction for Greece, 
which would continue unless the democracy was restored in the country. With this 
attitude towards Greece, the EC revealed its future policy towards the other demands 
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for membership, which stressed the existence of a democratic regime as the first 
condition of being an EC member. 
 Having understood this condition, Greece applied for membership in 1975 
soon after the restoration of democracy in 1974. In 1976, the European Commission 
reported that it was against the Greek membership as Greece was seen as lacking 
certain economic and political conditions, which were necessary for the EC 
membership. However, the Council favored the Greek application and in 1976, the 
negotiations for entry began which resulted in joining of Greece with the EC in 1981. 
 One reason for this situation might be the perceptions of some important 
European political leaders of that time. For these leaders, "Greece was seen as the 
source of most civilization in Europe at an intellectual level, and deserving privileged 
treatment within the union in its drive to re-establish democracy" (Pettifer, 1996: 18). 
In other words, because of some perceptions of history, although Greece had many 
deficiencies with respect to the Community criteria, it was regarded as having the 
potential of reforming itself and this put Greece in an advantageous position with 
respect to the other applicant Mediterranean countries in the entry negotiations. 
 Here, the important point is that, although Greece had lacked many required 
conditions for joining the EC, it began the negotiations of entry almost immediately 
after applying for membership and this situation shows that the EC had political 
motives for accepting the Greek application which formed the basis of the 
Mediterranean policy of the EC at that time and which affected the way in which the 
EC dealt with the applications of Spain and Portugal which came right after the 
Greek application. 
 Until the Greek application, the EC did not have a concrete Mediterranean 
policy and a Southern enlargement strategy, therefore, when Greece applied for 
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membership, the Community considered Greek's inclusion as a necessary step for the 
"development of a Mediterranean security policy [and] from the community 
perspective, the Greek application was significant because it presaged further 
Mediterranean enlargement" (Preston, 1997: 47-60). In other words, with the Greek 
application, the EC has opened the way for further Southern enlargement and it felt 
the need for designing a specific policy for dealing with the other Mediterranean 
countries which would demand to join the European Community. In designing its 
Mediterranean policy, the main challenges for the EC were economic and political. 
While dealing with the application of first Greece and then Spain and Portugal, one 
problem of the EC was the fact that these countries were poorer than the EC 
members and the other problem was the weakness of the democratic institutions in 
these countries, which is the main focus of the argument of this thesis. 
 Leaving the economic implications of the Southern enlargement aside, the 
desire to strengthen the democratic institutions and to consolidate the newly 
established democratic regime, were the basic political motives of both the EC and 
the applicant countries for engaging in negotiations beginning with Greece. "For 
Greece, the possibility of community membership was seen as a way of 
strengthening its Western political orientation and the EC was keen to be seen taking 
an active role in consolidating democracy in the Mediterranean region which was 
still very fragile" (Preston, 1997: 48-53).  
 The basis of the Mediterranean policy of the European Community was to 
encourage the strengthening of the newly established democratic institutions in the 
region. Although the three applicant Mediterranean countries had many economic 
obstacles for joining the EC, they managed to join the community for the sake of the 
preservation of the democratic institutions as we can observe in the accession periods 
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of Spain and Portugal who constituted the third wave and the second Mediterranean 
enlargement of the European Community. 
 As mentioned earlier, the Greek application for joining the EC in 1975 
created the possibility of enlarging the community towards the South and opened the 
way for future applications from this region. The Greek application was followed by 
that of Spain and Portugal in 1977 who, like Greece, wanted to consolidate their 
newly established democratic regimes in addition to their desire to end their 
international isolation, to take part in the world politics and to develop their weak 
economies. 
 For Spain and Portugal, "applying for membership was a major political 
move, implying a choice of framework within which all political and economic 
decisions would, in future, be exercised" (Preston, 1997: 65). In other words, 
pursuing the EC membership was a national policy for these countries that shaped 
the actions of their governments and it was seen as a means of reinforcing reform and 
creating a new state structure and a new political culture, which aimed to place Spain 
and Portugal together with the EC countries as a part of Europe. 
 The negotiations of accession began with Portugal in 1978 and with Spain in 
1979. Portugal and Spain applied for membership despite the existence of the EEC 
Treaty stating that democracy is a precondition for membership (McCormick, 1996: 
60). Although these countries lacked the stable democratic institutions, the EC 
started negotiations with them and this situation reveals the EC's desire to assist the 
consolidation of democracy in the Mediterranean countries. As Preston (1997) points 
out, the third enlargement was a "test of capability of the EC model to act as a 
stabilizing influence in the region and to establish a framework for the development 
of pluralist political and economic structures and processes"(63) and the EC felt it 
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necessary to play a crucial role in "helping [the Mediterranean applicants] overcome 
their internal resistance to economic and political reform" (Pierros, Meunier, 
Abrams, 1999: 223) and for this reason, although these countries had a long way to 
go to meet the political criteria of democratization for the EC membership and 
although their accession would create many economic problems because of the 
competition of agricultural products in the Mediterranean region especially with 
France, the EC began entry negotiations with Spain and Portugal as a part of its 
Mediterranean policy which aimed to make the community an international political 
actor that would have a positive effect over the establishment and consolidation of 
democratic institutions in the region. 
 The negotiations lasted for eight years with Portugal and for seven years with 
Spain and in 1986, both countries joined the European Community and the third 
wave of enlargement was complete. The boundaries of the community have shifted 
towards the South, as the three Mediterranean countries became members of the EC. 
The period during which the negotiations of accession took place with Spain, Greece 
and Portugal has led to the formation of a Mediterranean policy for the EC as it dealt 
with three countries from a common region with similar internal political situations 
and in all three cases, the basic political problem was the consolidation of democratic 
institutions. In sum, in the second and third waves of enlargement, both for the 
applicant countries and for the EC, the basic motive of starting the negotiations was 
democratization and the following section deals with the way in which the issue of 
democratization was perceived by the EC and the three Mediterranean countries 
during the accession process. 
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1.5.1 The Democratization of the Mediterranean Region 
 The previously mentioned three countries which made the EC shift its 
boundaries towards the South have many experiences in common with respect to 
their process of integration with the EC. These common experiences are mainly the 
result of the similar internal political situations in Greece, Spain and Portugal, which 
led them to the willingness for being a member of the EC. 
 First of all, for all three countries, pursuing the EC membership was a 
political move, which afterwards became a national policy. "Post-authoritarian 
governments in Spain, Greece and Portugal were progressively oriented to Western 
Europe, with formal membership of the Common Market as an ultimate goal" 
(Holman, 1996: 5). This goal shaped the national politics of these countries and re-
oriented the political objectives of the newly established democratic regimes in these 
countries.  
 The basic political motive of this new national policy was to secure the 
stability and the continuation of the democratic institutions, which were still fragile 
in the post-authoritarian regime period. The community membership was a means of 
returning to democracy and a guarantee for the preservation of the new democratic 
institutions and democratic evolution (Bidelux, 1996; Arter, 1993).  
 Being governed by the authoritarian regimes has led to an international 
isolation for Greece, Spain and Portugal and these countries desired to participate in 
the future shaping of Europe and to end the isolation they experienced in the 
international arena. Being an EC member would give these countries the chance "to 
become internationally respected political actors" (Holman, 1996: 65) and would 
provide recognition as equal partners in the international affairs. However, in order 
to achieve these goals, the precondition was to have well-functioning, stable 
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democratic political systems and this shows that for Greece, Spain and Portugal, 
democratization was both the means and the end within the process of European 
integration.  
 On one hand, in order to join the EC, these countries needed to democratize 
themselves. On the other hand, in order to achieve a stable democratic political 
system, these countries also needed to be a part of the EC as their policy was 
"democratization through internationalization"(Holman, 1996: 65). In other words, 
becoming an EC member would provide an incentive for preserving the democratic 
institutions. For the post-authoritarian governments of Greece, Spain and Portugal, 
joining the EC was necessary for a successful transition and consolidation of 
democracy. When these countries were trying to restore democracy, they felt the 
need of forming a new political culture that would give them an identity on the 
international scene and in the search for new identities, pursuing the EC membership 
provided the basis for the new political culture based on democratic ideals.  
 In sum, the integration of Greece, Spain and Portugal to the European 
Community was "both cause and effect of economic, social and political change, 
redefinition of national identities and orientations as liberalization and 
modernization" (Bidelux, 1996: 127) for them. The negotiations and the development 
of the relationships with the EC helped these countries to reconstruct their economic 
and political systems and made them partners in the European politics. However, if 
the EC side had not been willing to provide support for this reconstruction process, 
Spain, Portugal and Greece could not have had the chance to consolidate their 
democratic institutions, so the Mediterranean policy of the EC at that time had a 
facilitating effect over the integration processes in the second and third waves of 
enlargement. 
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1.5.2 The Mediterranean Policy of the EC During the Second and Third Waves 
of Enlargement 
The decision to enlarge the European Community towards South was a major 
move for the community because it had important economic, political and 
institutional implications for the EC. The reason why the Southern enlargement 
could be problematic was the fact that it dealt with the countries, which were poorer 
than the other EC members, and that it brought “political and military security 
tensions” (Preston, 1997: 46).  
Despite the economic burden that it would create, the Southern enlargement 
was perceived as a political move by the EC first for the security concerns and 
second for the aim of promoting democracy in the Mediterranean region. As the 
period was the Cold War years, the security of Europe was very important and the 
Mediterranean region was a critical area for the European security. For this reason, 
having close ties with the countries of the region could help the EC to secure peace. 
The main threat of the period was the threat of communism and the strategy 
of the European Community against this threat was the promotion of the democratic 
institutions in the continent. For this reason, the EC started to negotiate accession 
with Greece, Spain and Portugal although they had not improved their democratic 
institutions to the level required by the EC as promoting democracy in these 
countries would provide the security of the continent in the long run. 
In addition to these, the European Community had the image of the promoter 
of peace and democracy, and more concretely, of democratic peace and rejecting the 
applications of these three countries would damage this image, as the EC would 
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contradict with itself by rejecting to support the newly restored democracies in 
Greece, Spain and Portugal. Also rejecting their application could create a reaction in 
these countries and could stimulate the anti-democratic forces that could destroy the 
democratic system before it was consolidated (Seers, 1982: 7). 
The political conditions of the late 70s and early 80s urged the EC to consider 
a Southern enlargement towards the Mediterranean and to accept negotiating with 
Greece, Spain and Portugal although they were way behind the membership criteria 
set by the EC both in economic and political aspects. The EC was willing to support 
the process of democratic consolidation in these countries and its Mediterranean 
policy was to become an influential political actor in the region, which had a 
democratizing effect. However, whether this policy is being continued by the EU 
today or not is a matter that needs to be discussed and which will be analyzed in the 
following sections. 
 
1.6 The Change in the Objectives: A Shift in the EU's Mediterranean Policy? 
It is currently argued that "the European Union has recently become more 
sensitive to Mediterranean problems [and] the reinforcement of EC's Mediterranean 
policy reflects a growing understanding that if Europe does not concern itself with 
the problems of its Southern neighbors, then these problems will be exported 
northwards" (Gillespie, 1994:1). However, despite these newly emerging concerns 
about the stability of the Mediterranean region, the EU has taken a different approach 
from its policy during the second and third waves of enlargement and today, we can 
observe a shift in the Mediterranean policy of the EU and the reason why the 
political role of the militaries in the countries of the region are seen as an obstacle for  
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integration is this shift in the EU’s Mediterranean policy. In other words, the EU is 
no longer willing to be a political actor that assists democratic consolidation in the 
Mediterranean but on the contrary, it expects the Mediterranean countries to 
democratize themselves and sees democratization as a precondition for deepening of 
the EU- Mediterranean relations. 
There can be several reasons for this policy change. Firstly, it is possible to 
argue that during the past twenty years, the European Union faced many 
democratization problems regarding its institutions and decision making mechanisms 
and this led the community to set more strict criteria for membership and partnership 
regarding democratization in order to avoid further intra-community problems. In 
other words, the EU no longer has the luxury to help the countries to consolidate 
their democratic systems but it demands them to manage this in accordance with the 
political criteria set by the Union. This change of attitude is reflected upon the EU’s 
new Mediterranean policy and that is why the reports of the European Commission 
determine the defects of democracy in the countries of the region which are taken as 
obstacles against deepening of relationships and one of which is the political role of 
the institution of military. Secondly, we can also look at the situation from a broader 
perspective: During the first and second Mediterranean enlargement of the EU, the 
region was a domain of the Community, since the three countries would eventually 
become a part of the Union. For this reason, the democratization problems of Greece, 
Spain and Portugal were in a way the domestic problem of the EC and the 
Community had to take a more active role in the democratization of these countries 
as a part of its domestic policy. However, today, since there is no prospects for a 
Mediterranean enlargement for the EU, the Union remains more passive and as an 
outside partner in the democratization issues of the region. The Mediterranean region 
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is a domain of the foreign policy of the EU, thus the EU follows different policies 
towards the region in terms of promoting democracy.   
In order to have a closer look at the current situation of the EU’s 
Mediterranean policy of promoting democracy, first we need to analyze the Euro- 
Mediterranean partnership which is the official framework of the relations between 
the EU and the Mediterranean countries as the analysis of the EUROMED may be 
useful to understand how the militaries of the Mediterranean region are perceived by 
the EU in relation to the understanding of democratization. 
 
1.7 The Emergence of the EUROMED 
 Since the second wave of enlargement that integrated Greece with the 
Community, the Mediterranean region has been strategic for the European 
Community. One reason is the fact that the Mediterranean countries are EU’s third 
largest trading partners after EFTA and USA (Blair, 1999: 147). Because of its 
economic concerns, the European Union has an interest in the region and gives 
importance to the establishment of stability in the Mediterranean area as "the stability 
of the Southern Mediterranean often has a direct impact on the EU's member states" 
(Pierros et.al, 1999: 27). 
 The stability of the Mediterranean region is important for the security 
concerns of the EU as one dispute or conflict arising in this region affects the EU 
closely because of the nearness of the boundaries and "the security issues stem from 
the crucial role that the Mediterranean plays in European trade access to the wider 
world" (Joffe, 1997: 17). In short, the Mediterranean region is of strategic 
importance to the EU because of the economic and security concerns and a key 
external relations priority for the EU is thus to promote prosperity, democracy, 
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stability and security in the Mediterranean basin (Tovias, 2000). "The members of 
the European Parliament have been especially critical for the lack of democratic 
institutions and respect for human rights in the region" (Pierros et. al, 1999: 17) but 
there is a change of policy for the European Union in the promotion of these 
principles in the region. When the EU first became a political actor for the 
Mediterranean basin, it aimed to integrate the three Mediterranean countries in itself 
and help them to stabilize their political and economic systems as the members of the 
community. When it comes to the current Mediterranean policy of the EU, we can 
see that the community no longer wants to have members and partners with political 
and economic problems and prefers to support the stabilization process of the 
Mediterranean region as an outer partner. The Mediterranean program of the EU 
aims "to strengthen cohesion and develop economic ties between the EU and 
Mediterranean countries and to promote cooperation between these countries and 
their regional integration" (Blair, 1999: 147).  
 The shift in the Mediterranean policy of the EU indicates that the EU sees the 
Mediterranean region as a strategic area with which it has economic and political ties 
and that for the security of its interests, the EU prefers to support cooperation, 
stability and peace in the region. However, at the moment, unlike the cases of 
Greece, Spain and Portugal, the EU prefers to give its support to the region as an 
outside partner and the official framework of this support was determined by the 
launching of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. 
 The Euro-Mediterranean process began with the joint French- Spanish 
proposal to the Community in 1995, which formed the basis of the partnership 
between fifteen EU members and twelve Mediterranean partners. The countries, 
which participated in this partnership, were Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, 
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Malta, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey with Libya as an 
observer country. The principles of this partnership were determined in the 
Barcelona Conference in November 1995 where the EU member states and the 
twelve Mediterranean states agreed to the Barcelona Declaration. 
 
1.7.1 Barcelona Declaration 
 "Barcelona Declaration aimed to lead to strengthening of democracy and 
respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social 
development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding 
between cultures" (Hutchence, 2000: 37). In other words, the aim of the Barcelona 
Declaration was to guarantee security in the Mediterranean region. In order to 
achieve this goal, three pillars were established for the declaration. In order to 
guarantee human rights and basic political freedoms, a political and security 
partnership was formed as the first pillar. The second pillar was the economic one 
with the aim of establishing a Euro- Mediterranean free trade area by the year 2010 
and the third pillar dealt with cultural and social issues, including mutual respect for 
culture and religion (Blair, 1999: 264). 
 The launching of the Barcelona Declaration is significant in the sense that the 
EUROMED Partnership was institutionalized with its political, economic and 
cultural aspects and the Barcelona Process beginning in 1995 became "the means 
through which the EU supports the Mediterranean partners in their political, 
economic and social reforms while at the same time building a closer EU-
Mediterranean Partnership" (Tovias, 2000). Afterwards, the strategy of the EU has 
been the furtherance of the Barcelona Process and with its Mediterranean policy, the 
EU aimed to assist the establishment of peace and stability based on respect for 
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human rights and democracy together with the creation of a free trade area and 
respect for different cultures and religions. The political and security pillar of the 
Barcelona Declaration is an important issue in the sense that the concerns of the 
European Union regarding the democratization of the region stem from the principles 
set out in the political pillar of the Declaration. 
 
1.7.2 The Political and Security Pillar of the EUROMED and the Role of the 
Militaries 
 The Political and Security Partnership has the aim of establishing a common 
area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean region. According to the principles 
of the political and security pillar of the Barcelona Declaration, the Mediterranean 
partners have to 
"act in accordance with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; develop the rule of law and democracy in their political 
systems; respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee 
the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms; settle their 
disputes by peaceful means; and refrain from developing their military 
capacity beyond their legitimate defense requirements, at the same time 
reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual 
confidence with the lowest possible level of troops and weaponry"3 
  
 As it can be understood from the principles of the Barcelona Declaration 
stated above, for the security of the Mediterranean region, democracy is seen as the 
basic requirement through which peaceful resolution of disputes can be arranged 
among the Mediterranean partners. Again when we look at the principles of the 
Political and Security Partnership, we also see that the limitation of the military 
power is also a necessary ingredient of the security of the Mediterranean region and 
the limitation of the military power includes not only the decrease in weaponry and 
troops but also the limitation of the internal power and influence of the military over 
                                                 
3 Barcelona Declaration http://europa.eu.int 
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domestic political issues which have to be the responsibility of the civilian authority 
in principle. In other words, according to the perspective of the European Union, 
democratic institutions of the Mediterranean partners should be strengthened and 
democracy should be consolidated and one requirement to achieve this is to manage 
the democratic control of the military. 
 
1.7.3 The Democratic Control of the Militaries in the EUROMED 
 The countries in the Mediterranean region have various historical experiences 
with respect to the systems of government and most of the partners have been 
centralist, authoritarian and conservative states where the army had a strong role in 
political life traditionally and in its relations with these states, the EU expects them to 
liberalize their political systems. The European Union has increasingly underlined 
that respect for human rights is a fundamental element of the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership and expects from the Mediterranean partners to take concrete steps for 
democratization including putting the military under the control of the elected 
political authority and establishing a system where military is no longer a political 
actor as the principles agreed with the Barcelona Declaration have revealed.  
 At this point, it is necessary to underline the distinction between the civilian 
control and the democratic control of the armed forces as the establishment of the 
civilian control over the militaries does not necessarily mean that there exists the 
democratic control of the armed forces. For instance, under an authoritarian reigme, 
the army can be under the control of a civilian leader but this does not mean that the 
state is a democratic one. The criteria for the existence of the democratic control of 
the armed forces in a given country are that there exists parliamentary control over 
the promotions of the military personnel, over the war decisions, defense budget and 
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that there exists a civilian defense ministry (Eeken, 2002: 40) and the situation in the 
Mediterranean Partners and the responses of the EU to this situation should be 
evaluated according to these criteria; not merely according to the existence of the 
civilian authorities above the military ones. 
 In a way, the current Mediterranean policy of the EU resembles the initiation 
process of the European Community. The basic reasons of the formation of the idea 
of a union of European states were to establish long-lasting peace and stability in the 
continent, to prevent the occurrence of another war and to solve the disputes 
peacefully. Since the beginning, for peaceful conflict resolution, the promotion of 
democracy and keeping military under the control of the political authority have been 
the strategies of the European Community and now, the EU tries to apply the same 
strategy in the Mediterranean region by trying to assist the strengthening of the 
democratic institutions and solving the problems without the actual use of force for 
the sake of the security of the region. 
 One of the objectives of the Political and Security Partnership is "to increase 
confidence in the [Mediterranean] region through positive measures which are 
basically of civilian character "(Tovias, 2000). Stressing the importance of the civil 
measures is another indicator of the importance of refraining from the use of military 
force and from including the military in the solution of the conflicts in the EU's 
political understanding. This principle is valid not only in the external relations but 
also in the domestic matters of the countries. The military's sole responsibility is the 
external defense of the country and it is not a legitimate political actor who affects 
the state policies according to the perspective of the European Union and the EU 
tries to promote this principle in the Mediterranean region with the political and 
security pillar of the Barcelona Declaration. 
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 The Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs which is the third 
pillar of the Barcelona Declaration, also helps to promote the principles set in the 
political and security pillar. The third pillar aims to "encourage actions of support for 
democratic institutions and for strengthening of the rule of law and civil society"4. 
The Mediterranean policy of the EU aims to make the civil society organizations 
more influential actors in politics of the Mediterranean partners as democracy 
requires the participation of people to the decision-making process and the civil 
society organizations are an effective way of influencing the state policies and the 
government decisions. In a well-functioning democratic system, the decisions are 
taken by the elected civilian political authorities, the institution of military is not a 
political actor, is responsible for only the external defense of the country and is under 
the control of the civilians. For this reason, in order to create stable democracies in 
the Mediterranean region, the EU encourages the strengthening of the democratic 
institutions, increasing of the civil society organizations for active participation of 
the people in politics and discourages the political systems in which the military is 
considered as a political actor. 
 In order to create an incentive for the Mediterranean partners to fulfill the 
principles determined by the Barcelona Declaration, the EU gives the message that it 
can suspend its relations with the partners in case of breaking of one of these 
principles. As stated in the Barcelona Declaration, "the European Union's relations 
must remain conditional on each country's commitment to achieving respect for the 
principles underpinning the Barcelona Process, namely, strengthening of democracy 
and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, promotion 
of good-neighboring relations, respect for obligations under international law, 
                                                 
4 Barcelona Declaration http://europa.eu.int 
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intensified regional cooperation and integration, furthering of sustainable market 
economies and promotion of greater understanding between cultures"5.  
 The extent to which the Mediterranean partners are able to comply with the 
principles they accepted with participating the EUROMED affects the nature of the 
relationships between the EU and the individual countries. As mentioned earlier, the 
Mediterranean policy of the EU is a part of the foreign policy of the Union and for 
this reason, the principles, the institutional design and the policy objectives of the 
CFSP need to be analyzed in order to understand the importance of democratization 
and the significance of the democratic control of the militaries in the Mediterranean 
partners for the EU better. 
 
1.8 The CFSP and the EUROMED 
 
1.8.1 The Security Understanding in Europe 
 Especially after the Cold War, it is possible to argue that a new security 
understanding emerged in Europe. This is partly because of the fact that as the 
Communism threat disappeared, the risk of a direct, external attack decreased in 
Europe but more importantly, new forms of possible threats emerged in terms of 
security, which led to a broader conceptualization of security. After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and Communism and after the unification of Germany, "a more 
comprehensive security policy" (Eeken, 2002: 10) emerged in Europe and "if 
security is understood broadly as the absence of a threat to major social values, rather 
than protection against armed attack, then it assumes different meanings for different 
societies" (Lahav, 1993: 74) and it is possible to argue that this has been the security 
                                                 
5 Barcelona Declaration http://europa.eu.int 
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understanding of Europe after the Cold War which gave importance to the promotion 
of democracy, freedoms, rights and other social values and which preferred the 
civilian, peaceful solutions for conflicts instead of the use of military force. 
 In Europe, security is not only understood in military terms but it also covers 
the areas of civil society, non-military threats and economic and environmental 
issues6 and the aims of the European security policy are now to preserve peace and 
security and to promote freedom and democratic ideals.7 "The essential motivation of 
each European nation's foreign policy is to preserve its fundamental values" (Lahav, 
1993: 74) and in the case of Europe, this fundamental value has been democracy 
because as Jonathan Dean (1993) argues, after the Cold War, there have been four 
general objectives of European security which are "to promote a functioning 
democracy and market economy; to institutionalize the security of the international 
system; to be an autonomous community in defense and to establish confidence 
building measures" (106-107) all of which can be observed in the emerging security 
structure of the EU. The new forms of threat like separatist ethnic and religious 
conflicts, international terrorism, mass migration require a joint action and consistent 
measures and when we look at the EU policies, we can see that promotion of 
democracy and the rule of law is seen as a means of dealing with these threats. 
 "The EU has based its dominant understanding of international conflicts on 
liberal chains of equivalence: democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and 
the rule of law are seen as the basis of a stable and secure world. The EU's diagnosis 
of concrete conflicts is often that there has been a break with these principles and 
their re-establishment is seen as central to the solving of conflicts" (Larsen, 2002: 
291). This outlook to world problems can be observed in the objectives and the 
                                                 
6 Taken from the speech of Anders Oljelund-the Swedish Ambassador to Belgium and NATO in the 
conference held in Istanbul in June 2001 on European Security and Cooperation. 
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instruments of the CFSP and in the regional policies of the EU, especially in its 
relations with the Mediterranean partners. 
 Under the CFSP structure, the promotion of democracy is again very 
important in terms of the establishment of the civilian democratic control over the 
military power, and the way in which the military bodies are adopted to the CFSP 
framework can contribute to the argument that the democratic control of the 
militaries is a key aspect of the security and democracy understanding in the EU. 
  
1.8.2 The Democratic Control of the Military in the CFSP 
As many spokespeople of the EU member states explain, the European 
Security and Defense Policy is designed to contribute to conflict prevention and 
international crisis management and it is not the same as building a European army 
or an autonomous military capacity.8 Because of its defense objectives, CFSP implies 
the creation of military bodies but it is claimed that these military bodies are not the 
indicators of an army but they are for providing strategic planning.9 As Ana Bolin 
(2002) argues: 
"Instead of territorial defense, the main or the most frequent task of today's 
armed forces is that of military operations other than war and then peace 
support operations. The task of the military is instead more often that of in a 
practical way hindering war and its consequences. [………] The missions 
for which the military is called also often involve several more and very 
differing aims [like] humanitarian considerations, rehabilitation of political 
institutions, economic reconstruction etc. This broad nature of the missions, 
in its turn implies the presence of a number of different actors besides the 
armed forces, at the field of operations." (Bolin, 2002: 2) 
 
                                                                                                                                          
7 Speech of M. Hakkı Çaşın in the same conference. 
8 Taken from the speech of Anders Oljelund-the Swedish Ambassador to Belgium and NATO in the 
conference held in Istanbul in June 2001 on European Security and Cooperation. 
 
9 Ibid. 
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 This understanding affected the goals and the structure of the CFSP and the 
very basic aim of the CFSP was to strengthen the political instruments of the EU as 
an international actor and for this end, new bureaucratic and institutional bodies, both 
civilian and military, were created (Missiroli, 2001: 181). The result of this process 
has been the combination of "soft policy instruments (and) hard policy instruments" 
(Piona, 2002: 209), which are the civilian tasks and the military operation 
capabilities. 
Under this structure, it is possible to argue that the civilian instruments and 
military instruments are "unbalanced in terms of power and integrity" (Rummel, 
1996: 211). In other words, the civilian measures are more widely used and are more 
effective and the military instruments are not that strong. The EU has not stressed 
only the military aspect of the CFSP but rather; it was always expressed in 
combination with the civilian instruments and tasks. As Henrik Larsen (2002) 
suggests, "the EU has so far predominantly had a regional focus in its policies and 
had downplayed the use of military means in its policies even when the EU had the 
possibility of drawing on military means" (284). Because the EU has set itself up as a 
civilian international actor, democratic principles and the promotion of democracy in 
the world are an important part of the CFSP concept and this is reflected over the 
institutional design, the decision-making mechanism and the division of labor 
between the civilian and military bodies under the CFSP structure. 
 "The increased complex and political nature of the conflicts and crises for 
which the military is called upon means that political judgments are present in more 
decisions and all through the planning and execution of military missions" (Bolin, 
2002: 4) and this reality of the present time reflects itself upon the way in which 
military operations are perceived and decided under the umbrella of the CFSP where 
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the military operations are just one means of solving the conflicts, the military 
instruments "have no special status (or) role" (Larsen, 2002: 297) and they are 
"embedded in a civilian power context" (Larsen, 2002: 292). This situation 
influences the institutions created for the CFSP and the way in which the decisions 
are taken. 
The creation of the institutions is a necessary task in order to make the 
CFSP a credible and operational policy. For this purpose, the EU has been creating 
civilian and military institutions which cover the responsibilities of the CFSP and 
which aim to coordinate the political and military aspects of the European foreign 
and defense policy (De Nooy, 1996: 171) and in this framework, the role of the 
military is to provide recommendations on defense issues through the Military 
Committee and has no authority to make decisions about the operations. 
The broad understanding of security, the newly-emerging threats, the 
principles of promotion of democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the 
rule of law which were mentioned earlier can be combined with the internal decision-
making mechanism of the CFSP structure requiring the civilian, democratic control 
of the military in order to understand the foreign policy of the EU with respect to 
particular regions which can pose potential threats for Europe and thus which are of 
strategic importance for the European security like the Mediterranean region. 
1.8.3 The Implications of the CFSP over the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership  
 As the new understanding of security is based on factors other than a direct 
external attack and it has non-military aspects, for the EU, the political and economic 
stability of its neighbors become crucial and in the relationship of the EU with the 
Mediterranean region, the political and economic stability form an important aspect 
of the initiatives taken by the Union as it is believed that an unstable political and 
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economic system in this region can create pressures and threats in Europe in terms of 
mass migration, religious fundamentalism and terrorist activities (Algieri, 1996: 
195). 
 The fact that an unstable and unpredictable security environment exists in the 
Mediterranean and the "alarming political and economic trends" (Carpenter, 1999: 
69-70) made the EU include the Mediterranean region as one of the strategic areas of 
the CFSP and in this process, the Southern members of the EU played a major role. 
"The Mediterranization of EC" (De Vasconcelos, 1988: 135) and the historical 
existence of France in the region made the Mediterranean an area of interest for the 
EU. "The colonial, economic, cultural and strategic ties" (De Vasconcelos, 1988: 
136) of France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece with the Mediterranean basin made 
the Southern members of the EU lobby for a Mediterranean strategy for the EU that 
in a way reflected their national interests as they are the immediate recipients of a 
possible threat coming from this region.  
 With the efforts of these Southern members, “ethnic and religion-based 
violence, organized crime, migratory pressures, terrorism” (Calabrese, 1997: 88) in 
the Mediterranean region were added to the security agenda of the EU. It is possible 
to argue that “the EU’s southward enlargement set in motion two processes: first, a 
search by the Maghreb states for regional approaches to arrest their socio-economic 
decline; and second, a search by the Southern EU members to develop a formula for 
expanding the Community’s role in the Mediterranean” (Calabrese, 1997: 97). In 
other words, both the EU with the lobbying of its Southern members and the 
countries of the Mediterranean region were willing to cooperate with each other for 
the sake of their economic, political and security interests and this willingness led to 
the initiative of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
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 As Javier Solana (1999), the High Representative of the CFSP points out; 
“while the countries along the northern rim are increasingly prosperous as they move 
forward in the process of European political integration, many countries of the other 
side of the Mediterranean are experiencing a decline in standards. This trend is 
characterized by ever-increasing birth rates, declining prosperity, and a tendency 
towards less stable political environments” (36). Solana believes that “the political 
evolution in this region should be steered in a positive direction. Instead of clinging 
to existing patterns, European institutions should seek proactive, constructive, and 
specially tailored approaches to the region” (Solana, 1999: 37). It is argued that the 
EU can decrease tensions in the Mediterranean region through cooperation and 
economic and social aid (Carpenter, 1999: 84) and these ideas show the importance 
given to the civilian instruments within the CFSP context in the establishment of 
peace and order and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the Barcelona Process 
may be regarded as one of the projects of the civilian aspect of the CFSP designed 
for the promotion of democracy and order in a peaceful manner. The significance of 
the EUROMED, which was analyzed in detail in previous sections, is its non-
military emphasis on the solution of conflicts and problems (Calabrese, 1997: 106). 
Instead of emphasizing its military capabilities for conflict prevention and for 
pursuing its economic, political and security interests, EU remains as a civilian 
political actor in the Mediterranean region which uses non-military instruments like 
the Association Agreements and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership based on 
peaceful solutions, economic cooperation and promotion of democracy, human 
rights, basic freedoms and the rule of law in the region and because of the 
importance given to the non-military tasks in the Mediterranean policy, the lack of 
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the democratic control of the militaries in the region becomes a major problem for 
the EU in terms of regional security. 
 However, as it was mentioned in the previous sections of this chapter, since 
the Mediterranean region is not directly under the scope of the domestic concerns of 
the EU and since it is a part of the foreign policy, the promotion of democracy in the 
region becomes of secondary importance and the general policy towards South is the 
preservation of the status quo instead of initiating a democratization wave because of 
the security concerns of the Union.  
In order to understand this situation better, it can be useful to look at the 
specific cases of relationships between the EU and the Mediterranean partners where 
the democratic control of the militaries is considered as a problem. The following 
chapters deal with the cases of Turkey and Algeria who face with some problems in 
their relationships with the European Union because of the issue of the democratic 
control of the militaries in order to illustrate the impacts of the EU policies on the 
establishment of the democratic control over the armed forces and in order to 
illustrate the flexibilities of these policies. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE CASES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS I: 
TURKEY  
  
 Turkey-EC relations officially began with the Ankara Treaty of 1963 and 
Turkey has been pursuing membership for the European Union since the last official 
application in 1987. The Turkish experience in the road to the EU has a history of 
almost thirty years and although it was the first country to apply for the membership 
among the thirteen candidate countries, Turkey is the only country who did not get a 
certain date for starting the entry negotiations while the other twelve countries now 
have taken the date on which they will become the members of the European Union. 
Like the other potential member states, EU's relations with Turkey consist of 
certain bargaining processes and demands of both sides. The main concern of the 
European Union is to maintain certain standards in political, economic and social 
conditions among its members in order to prevent the adjustment problems in the 
integration process of the Union. The EU is experiencing the process of establishing 
an independent identity and these standards are the basis of this identity. The 
member states are expected to have similarly functioning political and economic 
systems and for this reason, the candidate countries are evaluated according to the 
political, economic and social criteria of the European Union and they are expected 
to meet the standards that are determined by the EU. 
One aspect of these criteria is, as mentioned above, the political standards set 
by the EU. These political standards are based on the principle of democracy, which 
is the very initial reason of the formation of the idea of a union in Europe. As it was 
mentioned in the first chapter, the principle of democracy was a key concept in the 
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formation process of today's European Union and it still plays a key role in 
determining the EU's approach towards the potential member countries as a criterion 
to evaluate the eligibility of these countries for membership. 
 In the case of Turkey, the issue of democratization has an important part in 
shaping the nature of EU-Turkey relations. There have been and are certain 
demands of the EU regarding the reforms for democratization from Turkey in order 
to adjust the Turkish political culture to that of the EU and one of these demands is 
about the modification of the role of the military in Turkish politics. As one of the 
Mediterranean partners, the case of Turkey will illustrate certain aspects of the 
problem of the political role of the militaries in the region and its implications over 
the democracy policies of the EU and the proper starting point of these analysis is to 
begin with examining the political role of the military in Turkey. 
 
2.1 "A Political Army"? 
 The Turkish armed forces are defined as "a political army"(Güney, 2002: 
162) by some scholars. As Ümit Cizre (1997) states in 'The Anatomy of the 
Turkish Military's Political Autonomy', "the most profound contradiction marking 
Turkish democracy in the 1990s is the demonstrated inability of the civilian 
politicians to control the military. The Turkish military enjoys a strong degree of 
political autonomy" (151). It is a well-known truth that the Turkish military is 
some sort of a political actor who has an influence over the state policies and in 
order to find out the reasons lying behind this influence, we should look at the 
historical context in which the Turkish state developed and which shaped the 
current political position of the army. 
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 First of all, the Ottoman heritage still has an impact over the military-civilian 
relations and military's involvement in politics in Turkey. The enlargement of the 
Ottoman Empire was based on the conquests and it was necessary "to conquer in 
order to establish a state"(Halpern, 1981: 277). This gave the army an important 
power because it was the institution that made the greatest contribution to the 
development and strength of the state. The conquests also increased the legitimacy 
of the army in the eyes of the citizens, as the soldiers were the heroes who gained 
new lands for the empire. Moreover, there was no tradition of separating military 
authority from the civilian one and the rulers of the empire were at the same time 
commanders. The lack of distinction of the authority areas of the civilian and the 
military powers in the Ottoman Empire can be seen as an underlying factor that 
shaped the contemporary military-civilian relations in Turkey and this historical 
fact can serve as a legitimacy source for the military interventions in the political 
matters. 
 In addition to these, when the Ottoman Empire began to lose power, the 
rulers felt the need to modernize the state institutions and the modernization 
attempts first began with the army. However, these attempts were not aimed at 
changing the role and status of the army but they aimed to modernize the army in 
order to increase its strength and this enabled the army to be more influential over 
the policy matters (Kayalı, 1994: 26). Today, the modernization of the army still 
has a great deal of importance as it is seen as necessary for the national security of 
the country and having the latest technology gives power to the institution of 
military over the civilian institutions. 
 Like the traditions of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish War of Independence 
also played a role in increasing the political influence of the military and it mostly 
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had a legitimizing effect for the presence of the army in the discussions and 
decisions of the political matters. After the World War I, people in Anatolia were 
disorganized and incapable of giving reaction to the invasion of their land and it 
was the soldiers who mobilized the masses (Güney, 2002: 163) to cope with the 
invasions and when the War of Independence ended with the Turkish victory, the 
army became a hero in the eyes of people. The soldiers were the rescuers and this 
provided the legitimacy basis for the further actions of the soldiers. They founded 
the republic and carried out the reforms by using the support coming from the 
legitimacy they gained with the victory in the war. 
 As mentioned above, during the Republican period, the modernization 
project was led by the officers and army was seen as a backup in the 
modernization of the republic. The state elites saw the military as a means of 
Westernization, the army was seen as a reformer and the elite had a positive image 
about the influence of the military in politics (Kayalı, 1994: 71). This situation is 
valid in today's Turkey as the military is identified with the modern face of Turkey 
with its high technology and with the values that it advocates. 
 Although the army was the founder and the modernizer of the republic, there     
were also attempts to separate politics from the army in the early republican period. 
As Halpern (1981) stated in "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class", 
the Turkish army created the modern state and left the political arena in 1924. With 
the 1924 Constitution, the commanders and officers who were at the same time 
members of the parliament were forced to choose between being a soldier and being 
a politician. In one of his speeches, Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the Turkish 
Republic, stated that "Commanders should avoid the effects of politics while they 
are fulfilling their duties as soldiers. They should remember that there are people 
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who will fulfill the political obligations. The separation of the army from politics is 
an important principle of the republic"(Öztürk, 1993: 58). However, M. Kemal also 
defined military as the "ultimate guardian of the republic"(Güney, 2002:163) and the 
army has seen and still sees being the guardian of the state as their primary duty in 
the sense that they see themselves as responsible for the protection of secularism, 
democracy and the integrity of the republic. "The ultimate justification for the 
military's political predominance rests on its guardianship of the national interest, of 
which maintaining national unity is considered to be the most important component" 
(Cizre, 1997: 154). This guardianship role made the army a political actor in Turkey 
and an example of this situation is the position of the military in the clash between 
the Democrat Party (DP) and the Republican People's Party (RPP) during 1950s and 
1960s in which the military took the side of the RPP and in a way cooperated with 
the state elite and this led to the first military intervention in the Turkish Republic in 
1960. 
 In the history of the Turkish Republic there are three military interventions to 
politics in 1960, 1971 and 1980. These interventions may be seen as the most 
important determinant of the contemporary political role of the military because in 
each intervention, the military was the institution who made the constitutions of the 
republic and although they re-established the democratic system after each coup, 
they determined how the system would function and while leaving the political 
scene they gained important exit guarantees which enabled the military to legalize or 
constitutionalize its guardianship role. “The economic and political instability led to 
the military interventions to re-establish order and the military was seen as the 
guardian over the state and society"(İba, 1999: 45). This situation legalized and 
 43 
legitimized the political role of military and the most important institution of this 
role is the National Security Council. 
 
2.2 The National Security Council and the Concept of National Security 
 The National Security Council is the organ through which the military 
commanders take part in taking decisions regarding the security matters of the 
Turkish Republic. It was created by the 1961 Constitution and in a way legalized the 
role of the military in politics. The 1982 Constitution "enlarged the constitutional 
role of military"(Güney, 2002: 164) and the guardianship role of the military was 
institutionalized. The composition and the duties of the NSC are defined by the 
constitution and the related laws. Ümit Cizre (1997) argues that:  
"it has been the most decisive leg of a dual system of executive decision-
making, the other leg being the council of ministers. The concrete 
decisions of the council cover an unprecedented spectrum: determining 
the curriculum in schools; regulating television stations' broadcasting 
hours; abolishing the penal immunity of members of parliament from the 
(Kurdish) Democrat Party; closing down certain prisons and television 
stations; making bureaucratic appointments of the ministries of public 
works in the southeast; postponing the termination date of military service 
for current conscripts [...]" (158). 
 
As it can be understood, the NSC is capable of influencing a wide range of 
issues from daily life as well as political life, which makes the military a decisive 
political actor dealing with areas which are elsewhere under the responsibility of the 
civilian authorities. The NSC consists of the president, prime minister, the ministers 
of defense, interior and foreign affairs, the chief of general staff and the other three 
top military commanders. Also according to the agenda, other related ministers and 
bureaucrats can participate in the meetings. In the 1982 Constitution, the duties of 
the NSC were defined as: 
1. to determine the national security policy of the state, 
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2. to determine the measures related to national security policy, 
3. to follow social, political, economic, cultural and technological 
developments that will influence the national security policy, 
4. to determine the fundamental principles of directing the national 
objectives, 
5. to determine the measures to maintain the constitutional order, to 
ensure national unity and integrity, to unite Turkish nation around the 
principles and reforms of Atatürk, 
6. to determine the measures to maintain the existence, independence of 
the state; the integrity and indivisibility of the country and public peace 
and security, 
7. to determine the views for states of emergency, martial law, 
mobilization and state of war, 
8. to determine the necessary principles for budgets and funds for those 
measures, 
9. to propose options to the Council of Ministers who is obliged to 
consider the decisions of NSC with priority.10 
 
The National Security Council is an advisory organ to shape the policies of 
government but " the decisions of the NSC regarding the existence, independence of 
the state; integrity and indivisibility of the country; the protection of the peace and 
security of the society are considered by the Council of Ministers with priority"(İba, 
1998: 184) and this makes the NSC stronger than an advisory organ. 
In the past years, NSC has been "a means of controlling the civilian 
authority"(Özdemir, 1989: 241) and it has been an organ, which influenced the 
government policies without being accountable to the people. It is a fact that the 
NSC is not purely a military organ and the civilians and the soldiers take the 
decisions together. However, the military wing of the NSC is more stable with 
respect to the values and ideals shared by the military as a whole institution. The 
position of the military regarding the state matters does not change when the 
commanders change while the civilian side changes hand in every election and the 
military wing of the NSC remains well-informed and more experienced on the 
political maters than the civilian wing. Moreover, theoretically, the president sets the 
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agenda of the NSC but in practice, it is the military who does this and the agenda 
setting power of the military in the NSC, makes the military wing more powerful 
and the council more than an advisory organ and this is seen as an obstacle against 
the democratic consolidation in Turkey. 
As mentioned earlier, the Turkish military acting as a political actor through 
the NSC is seen as one deficiency of the Turkish democracy and at this point it is 
worth to analyze the understanding of the concept of national security in Turkey 
because the way in which the national security is defined, enables the military to be 
legitimately present in the political scene. 
The redefinition of the national security concept in the 1990s by the 
inclusion of domestic threats like Kurdish separatism and rise of political Islam, 
expanded the influence of military over politics and its autonomy from the civilian 
actors" (Cizre, 2003). In 1990, in "The Concept and the Scope of the State", the 
General Secretariat of the National Security Council defined national security as 
"equal to the existence of a state and a nation and as the protection of the existence 
and unity of a state against internal and external threats"(İba, 1998: 102-103). Here, 
including both the external and internal threats and how these threats are perceived 
provide a wide range of areas to which military can interfere legally and legitimately 
as in the Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law No. 211 it is 
stated that "the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces is to protect the Turkish country 
and the Turkish Republic defined by the constitution… Turkish Armed Forces is 
responsible for the maintenance of the national security and realization of the 
national objectives."(Öztürk, 1999: 13). 
                                                                                                                                          
10 Taken from the official website of the National Security Council. www.mgk.gov.tr 
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In the case of Turkey, the concept of national security is not merely the 
protection of the country from the external enemies but it also covers the internal 
threats which can vary in a broad range and can be perceived in various ways and 
this broad understanding of national security provides the legitimate ground for the 
military to intervene to the politics. In order to clarify how broadly the concept of 
national security is understood in Turkey, it might be helpful to examine Milli 
Güvenlik Siyaseti Belgesi- The Document of National Security Politics which states 
the perceived actual and potential threats and the issues that are considered as 
related with the national security of the state. The document is revised whenever it is 
seen necessary or there occurs a new perception of threat and by some, this 
document is regarded as "the secret constitution"(İba, 1998) of the state. 
In the summer of 2001, the Document that was prepared on 31st October 
1997 was published in one of the daily newspapers; Hürriyet and it stated the threats 
of that time which the army wanted to emphasize. According to the document, "the 
religious fundamentalism, political Islam, extreme nationalism, extreme left, the 
activities of 'the extreme nationalist mafia' and Greece and Syria"(Yeni Düşünce, 
2001) were defined as the potential threats for the Turkish national security. Also in 
January 1999, the organized criminal groups of economic activities were also added 
to this list of the potential threats. The crucial point of this document is that it shows 
how the army deals with various aspects of the social, political and economic life in 
Turkey and that it does not merely deal with the external defense of the country. 
Whenever a new government comes to the power, the military authorities give a 
briefing about the document in the first month of the government and it is expected 
from the government to comply to this document with its policies (Yeni Düşünce, 
2001). In a way, the security policies and objectives are defined by the army and the 
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government has to obey these objectives and the Document of the National Security 
Politics becomes a means of shaping the state policies for the army. 
 
2.3 The Other Symptoms of the Political Influence of the Turkish Military 
While the political role of the military in Turkey is criticized, the basic point 
is the role of the National Security Council which stems from the understanding of 
the national security as mentioned in the previous section. However, there are other 
factors which are regarded as the indicators of the importance and power of the 
army as a political actor and as an institution in addition to the existence of the NSC. 
          First of all, the military is an autonomous institution in Turkey and there is no 
civilian control over its affairs. The promotions, retirements, appointments and 
sanctions for the military personnel are determined by the army itself and the army 
has its own court for the crimes committed during the military service. In addition to 
being free from the control of the civilian institutions, the Chief of General Staff is 
not responsible to the Minister of Defense and this feeds the autonomous existence 
of the army. Moreover, the share of defense expenditures in the national budget is 
determined by the military authorities, sent to the Great National Assembly and 
usually ratified without any debates. The military owns some firms as an economic 
support for its personnel and this makes the army an economic actor as well as a 
political one. In addition to these, the power of the army can be observed at the 
society-level. The Turkish men have to fulfill an obligatory military service when 
they come to the age of twenty and this provides a linkage between the civilians and 
the army which helps to transmit the values that the army defends to the people. 
Another transmitting device for these values is "the course of national security" 
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which is a compulsory course in the Turkish high schools and which is taught by the 
army officers instead of regular civilian teachers. 
In addition to these indicators, there are several factors that increase the 
autonomous power of the military. The army has a great deal of popular support and 
is one of the most trusted institutions by the people. The army is seen as the symbol 
of stability, honesty, modernity and discipline. Also the geopolitical position of 
Turkey requires it to have powerful armed forces and Turkey's painful experience of 
terrorism makes people sensitive to both external and internal threats and they 
expect protection from the armed forces. It can also be argued that the failure of the 
civilians in governance and solving the problems leaves space and provides 
legitimacy for the army to act as a political actor. 
In the past six years, after the NSC decisions of 28th February 1997, the 
civilian- military relations and the political influence of the army have taken a new 
route. The decisions of the NSC were urging the government whose head was the 
leader of Islamist view, Necmettin Erbakan to take important measures against the 
rise of religious fundamentalism and the process which started with these decisions 
has finally led to the resignation of the government. For some scholars, the 28th 
February process is another coup in Turkish politics but whether it is a coup or not, 
it has revealed an important aspect of the military's presence in Turkish politics. In 
this process, instead of a direct intervention and a break in the regime, the military 
propagandized about its views and organized meetings like a pressure group in order 
to share these views. These actions of the military were supported by some political 
leaders, civil society groups, business associations and the media whose actions 
justified the army's involvement in politics.  Whether it is the fourth coup in Turkish 
politics or not, this process reveals that Turkey has to face serious adjustment 
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problems with the EU in terms of the duties and the authority of the army as "while 
the military's guardian role by definition requires that it remains as the final source 
of authority in Turkey, this prominence is one critical factor negatively affecting 
Turkey's full inclusion into the EU" (Cizre, 2003). 
In Turkey, the military is at the center of the debates about Turkey's 
integration with the EU. Unlike the situation in Europe where military raises its 
voice only in defense matters, in Turkey, the commanders of the army share their 
opinions about the political agenda of Turkey with the public and in the debates 
about the EU in Turkey, the views of the army are easy to encounter in the media 
which sometimes causes tense situations between the military and the government. 
The top commanders of the Turkish military often state that they are not 
against the European Union and that Turkey has to join the EU11. However, they 
have some security concerns which make the commanders be suspicious about the 
reforms made in order to fulfill the membership criteria. The recent discussions on 
the new reform package for the EU have shown that the military and the civilian 
authorities have different views about the accession process of Turkey to the EU.12 
These debates and the warnings coming from the top commanders in terms of 
regime and continuation of the system raise doubts about the consolidation of 
democracy in Turkey for the EU and create various adjustment problems in the road 
to the EU. 
For the several reasons stated above, Turkish military is highly involved in 
the political matters as a decision-maker and as an agenda-setter and this situation is 
one of the key issues shaping the nature of Turkey-EU relations as it is seen as a 
sign of the lack of the democratic culture in Turkey by the European Union and in 
                                                 
11 Hürriyet (daily newspaper),  30th May 2003. 
12 Hürriyet (daily newspaper),  30th May, 10th- 11th June, 2003. 
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the following sections, the approach of the EU towards the political situation in 
Turkey with respect to the position of the army in politics will be discussed. 
 
2.4 The EU's Approach Towards the Turkish Armed Forces 
 The underlying reason of the criticisms coming from Europe towards the 
National Security Council and the political power of the army in Turkey is that the 
concept of national security is understood differently in Europe from Turkey. After 
the World War II, the concept of the national security was redefined in Europe. As 
mentioned in detail in the previous chapters, when the war ended, the main 
objectives of the European states were to prevent another intra-European war and to 
reconstruct Europe. In order to realize these objectives, the European states had to 
cooperate instead of perceiving each other as potential threats and they believed that 
their security could be established through peace. The main threats of that time were 
the Soviet Union and the danger of communism for the Europeans and establishing 
peace through the promotion of democracy was the solution of Europe to protect 
itself against these threats. 
 In addition to these, Europe's approach to the institution of military is also 
different as a result of the experiences of wars. Because of the two world wars, 
extreme armament and the strong military are seen as undesirable for the European 
states and in the post-war period, they felt the need to control the armament of each 
other as it was in the case of de-militarization of Germany. Military is an institution 
that has to be under the control of the civilian political authority in order to prevent 
the occurrence of the armed-conflicts among the states and to find peaceful solutions 
to the emerging conflicts. 
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 In Europe, army is a professional institution which is "ascribed by law the 
duty of defending the country against external attack and which is under the control 
of the civilian political authority"(Edmonds, 1990: 6). The armed forces are away 
from political activity and their engagement in these activities is considered as 
illegitimate and undemocratic. 
"As a general rule, armed services are prevented from taking decisions about 
the security of the society independently. This is the responsibility of the 
government who, in democracy, is accountable to people"(Edmonds, 1988: 118) in 
Europe. Because of the democratic principles, the crucial decisions affecting the 
society should be taken by the institutions which are directly accountable to the 
citizens and whose decisions can be questioned and criticized through democratic 
means. Military, being responsible for the defense of the country must be under the 
control of the political authority because if it is an autonomous institution, when it 
makes a wrong decision affecting the citizens negatively, citizens have no means to 
question this decision. This is the general understanding of the armed forces in 
democratic states for Europe and as it can be seen, this understanding is completely 
different from the one in Turkey. 
 In Europe, military plays a little part in domestic policies of the states while 
in Turkey; it is considered as the guardian of the regime and the savior of the state, 
which has been an alternative to the democratic regime. The security understanding 
of both the EU and Turkey can be considered broad but this broad understanding has 
had different outcomes for the two parties in terms of the duties assigned to the 
militaries. In the EU case, this broad understanding led to the emphasis on the non-
military aspects of defense and security, while in Turkey the broad definition of the 
national security concept enabled the institution of military to be more influential in 
 52 
the political matters. In addition to that, the security risks of Turkey are very 
different from those of the European Union. Because of its geo-political position, 
Turkey has to consider certain threats carefully while formulating its foreign and 
security policies and if it joins the EU, these policies might be incompatible with the 
security organization of the European Union because of different threat perceptions 
and one recent statement of the former Chief of General Staff, Hilmi Özkök, 
demonstrates this situation. The statement of the former Chief of General Staff 
which appeared in Jane’s Defense Weekly, in January shows that Greece is 
perceived as a threat by Turkey. In his statement, Özkök argues that although there 
has been a progress in Turkey-Greece relations in the recent years, the Greek 
officials and politicians still see Turkey as a threat to their security and that in this 
case, it is reasonable that Turkey sees Greece as a potential threat, too.13 However, 
in case of joining the EU, Turkey is required to change this perception. In addition 
to that, terrorism is also an important threat for the Turkish national security with 
which military and state have been coping but the EU wants Turkey to find a 
peaceful solution to this problem which is against the defense understanding of the 
Turkish army and state. 
    The way in which the CFSP of the EU is designed also reveals the 
differences in the understanding of security and role designed for the militaries 
between EU and Turkey. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Cologne 
European Council of June 1999 determined the decision-making mechanism in the 
CFSP. According to the Council decisions, CFSP organization consists of a General 
Affairs Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, a Politics and Security 
Committee, a Military Committee providing advice and the EU military staff to 
                                                 
13 Taken from Hürriyet (daily newspaper), 22.01.2003. 
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inform these bodies (Udum, 2002: 83). The important point about this structure is 
that it keeps the military under the civilian control and the final decisions are made 
by the politicians elected by and accountable to the people while the military 
authorities only provide advice for these decisions. This structure is again different 
from the process of taking decisions about the security issues in Turkey where 
military is both an actor and an agenda-setter and this situation may create another 
adjustment problem in Turkey-EU relations. However, the most widely discussed 
issue regarding the role of military in Turkey-EU relations is its political power 
which is seen as an obstacle against democracy. 
Turkey has been given the official candidate status in the Helsinki European 
Council of 10-11 December 1999 and as a candidate country, Turkey is being 
evaluated by the progress reports prepared by the EU Commission regarding its 
performance in realizing the Copenhagen Criteria. In these reports and on other 
occasions, one of the criticisms towards Turkey is about the status and the power of 
the National Security Council and the interference of military to politics. By the EU 
authorities, NSC is regarded as an undemocratic institution and they criticize the 
lack of parliamentary control over defense and security issues and criticize the Chief 
of General Staff for not being responsible to the Ministry of Defense like the 
democratic countries. "The ability of the General Chief of Staff to influence the 
civilian bureaucracy in Turkey is facilitated by the lack of career civil servants 
specializing in military affairs who could provide a buffer between the military and 
society" (Cizre, 1997: 159) and under these circumstances of Turkey, the EU 
authorities argue that the current role of Turkish army in politics is one of the 
obstacles against starting the negotiations for membership with Turkey for it does 
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not meet the necessary political conditions for membership defined by the 
Copenhagen Criteria. 
In the year 2000, The Accession Partnership Agreement was signed between 
the EU and Turkey and the aim of this agreement was "to determine the areas of 
priority for further progress in the areas determined in the Annual Report 2000 of 
the Commission on Turkey for Turkey's membership"14. In this agreement, the 
short-term and medium-term objectives for Turkey were determined in order to 
meet the required criteria for the EU membership and the National Program was 
prepared in the light of the Accession Partnership Agreement. 
In the agreement, one of the political criteria that had to be met in the 
medium-term on which the government had to start working by the year 2001, was 
making the NSC's constitutional role of being an advisory body to the government 
compatible with its counter-parts in the EU members. In the National Program, one 
of the middle-term objectives was dealing with the NSC and it was stated that 
"National Security Council, which is a constitutional organ, is an advisory body 
regarding the issues of national security and the Constitution and the related laws 
will be re-examined in the middle-term period in a way that will define the structure 
and duties of the Council in a more clear way"15. As a concrete step to realize these 
objectives, in 2001, the number of civilian members in the NSC was increased, the 
NSC was assigned an advisory role and the exit guarantees given to army by the 
1982 Constitution were eliminated by the amendments of law. However, the recent 
developments show that these proposed changes are not easy to realize as when the 
government proposed to change the duties and the composition of the NSC as a part 
of the reform package for EU accession in way which will decrease the influence 
                                                 
14 Source: The EU Commission Representative in Ankara www.belgenet.com 
15 www.belgenet.com 
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and power of the military wing of the council, the army has opposed this initiative 
immediately in order to preserve their position.16 However, despite the oppositions 
of the military wing of the NSC, by the 30th July 2003, with the 7th Reform Package 
for the EU, major changes were made in the duties and responsibilities of the NSC. 
According to the new law, the duties and authority of the Secretary General of the 
NSC were redefined and the possibility of a civilian to be the Secretary General was 
created17. These changes can be considered as a major step towards increasing the 
democratic control over the security issues but it is a known fact that these changes 
are still an outcome of the process of bargaining between the military and civilian 
authorities and the consent of the military wing of the NSC has to be taken before 
making any changes in the duties and composition of the Council. This situation 
shows that the civilian authorities lack the power to change the existing balance of 
power and a change in the composition of the NSC, the reduction of the defense 
expenditures or the size of the armed forces is likely to occur only if it is initiated by 
the military like the recent reduction in the duration of military service which was a 
proposal coming from the military wing of the power structure in Turkey. 
It needs to be accepted that the organization of the armed forces is different in 
Turkey from Europe as well as the way in which the concept of national security is 
understood and this situation is a serious obstacle against Turkey's possible 
accession to the EU since, as a candidate country and as a potential member of the 
Union, the problems of Turkish democracy is considered as a part of the domestic 
policy of the EU and this creates various adjustment problems between the two 
parties on Turkey's membership track. 
 
                                                 
16 Hürriyet (daily newspaper), 18-19 July, 2003. 
17 www.abhaber.com 
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 However, in Turkey, this adjustment problem is often analyzed as an unfair 
treatment towards Turkey. Most of the politicians, army head quarters and some 
civil society leaders in Turkey argue that Turkey is a democratic republic governed 
according to the rule of law and while the negotiations with Spain, Greece and 
Portugal began despite the absence of a consolidated democratic regime; counting 
the National Security Council which is a constitutional advisory organ consisting of 
both civilians and soldiers as one of the reasons preventing democratic consolidation 
in Turkey and preventing the beginning of the negotiations for membership does not 
seem like a reasonable claim for the EU. One example of this view is the press 
release of the Chairman of the Turkish Union of Chambers (TOBB), Rıfat 
Hisarcıklıoğlu on 19th November, 200218, which criticized EU for its approach 
towards Turkish army by claiming that Turkish military is loyal to democracy and 
has proved this loyalty by leaving the political scene to the civilians after all three 
military interventions. In Turkey, the EU's criticisms towards the political role of the 
Turkish army are mostly seen as an excuse for not accepting Turkey for membership 
and they are regarded as lacking reasonable grounds. However, "only when a 
democratic and legitimate civilian-military relationship is established can political 
decision making, the power and status of the representative institutions; the style of 
leadership, and the ways of exercising political power become more democratic" 
(Cizre, 1997: 163) and the current nature of the civilian-military relations in Turkey 
is completely illegitimate and undemocratic according to the understanding in 
Europe and unless this situation is altered, the political role of the Turkish Armed 
Forces is likely to remain as a serious obstacle against Turkey's full membership to 
the EU. 
                                                 
18 Hürriyet (daily newspaper). 
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2.5 The CFSP and the Turkish Armed Forces: More Adjustment Problems? 
 As mentioned earlier, one of the reasons that the political role of the army in 
Turkey is criticized by the EU is the fact that the national security concept is 
understood differently by the two parties. In Europe, one basic aspect of the 
establishment of security is peace among states through cooperation and spread of 
democratic regimes while in Turkey, there is a different security understanding 
which approaches to the security cooperation with other states in a more suspicious 
manner. Because of the geo-political position of Turkey, the military assumes an 
important role in Turkey while in the EU, the civilian institutions are more important 
in the solution of conflicts. Because of the political and security environment in 
Europe, defense budgets have been shrinking but this has not been the case in 
Turkey19 and this situation indicates the fact that the concepts of security and threat 
are understood differently in Turkey and EU and they are in different security 
environments and this situation poses an adjustment problem for the future of EU-
Turkey relations. 
 In relation to this, another adjustment problem is the preferences in terms of 
solution of conflicts. As we have seen, in the CFSP of the EU, the civilian 
instruments are dominant over the military ones for various reasons and the military 
operation is the last way of solving the problems. However, in Turkey, the army is in 
such strong position that, the military capabilities are likely to be preferred in case of 
a crisis and this is contrary to the understanding in Europe, as the recent Iraq crisis 
has demonstrated. When Turkey wanted to send troops to Northern Iraq for its 
territorial security and to prevent mass migration, EU was totally against it and it was 
                                                 
19 Taken from the speech of Onur Öymen, former Turkish representative to NATO, in the conference 
held in Istanbul in June 2001 on European Security and Cooperation. 
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perceived as a further threat for the stability of the region as in the European Council 
in Brussels (20-21 March 2003), the member states "called on the countries of the 
region to refrain from actions that could lead to further instability"20 and this 
statement was specifically directed to Turkey's desire to intervene the crisis through 
military means and reflected the general tendency of the CFSP of the EU. 
 Another adjustment problem in terms of the integration of Turkey to the EU 
and to the CFSP is the decision-making mechanism of the CFSP and the democratic 
control of the military in this context. As we know, the major criticism towards the 
Turkish Armed Forces is based on their political role in terms of the National 
Security Council. In Turkish case, "the major factor contributing to the difficulty in 
establishing civilian control over the military is the failure of the civilian forces to 
question the prevailing power configuration" (Cizre, 1997: 162) and unless the 
existing power structure is challenged by the civilians, the status quo is likely to be 
preserved and the armed forces are likely to remain outside the civilian control and 
this situation is seen as a major obstacle for Turkey's EU membership for being 
contrary to the democratic principles of the Copenhagen Criteria. One recent 
statement of Günther Verhaugen, the EU Commissioner responsible for enlargement 
demonstrates this situation. Although Verhaugen states that Turkey can begin the 
negotiations for full membership by the end of 2004, in order for this to happen, "the 
role of the army has to be regulated and there should not be any military 
representatives in the civilian institutions and the army should be under political 
control; not the contrary."21 
 Besides the political aspect of the issue, the situation creates adjustment 
problems in terms of Turkey's place in the CFSP because in case of a Turkish 
                                                                                                                                          
 
20 http://europa.eu.int Presidency Conclusions-Brussels European Council 
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accession to EU, the individual security interests of Turkey will become a domain of 
the CFSP and like the other member states, Turkey will want to retain its full 
sovereignty in security matters. The Turkish case can be more problematic because, 
in Turkey, in the decisions and actions regarding the security matters, the military 
plays a major role and in the National Security Council, it is not the recommender 
but the agenda setter and decision maker while in the CFSP, the military institutions 
do not have such power and this situation is likely to create problems in terms of the 
future participation of Turkey to CFSP framework as a full member. 
 In addition to these, being a part of the CFSP may also be contrary to the 
security policies of Turkey because although it has to be admitted that Turkey-
Greece relations are less tense than the past and the Greek-Turkish rivalry seems to 
be less serious, this does not guarantee that there will not emerge a crisis situation 
between the two countries which can create various problems under the CFSP body 
as in the past although both sides were NATO members, this fact could not prevent 
crisis between the two parties. In the past, "Greece conditioned its support for the 
Euro-Mediterranean initiative on assurances that the EU would commence structured 
dialogue on the accession of Cyprus and Malta following the Barcelona Conference. 
For six months, Greece obstructed the release of MEDA funds in an effort to win EU 
support in its dispute with Turkey over two disputed Aegean islands" (Calabrese, 
1997: 104). At the moment the relations between the two countries seem to be 
friendlier and Greece seems to support Turkey's accession to the EU. However, there 
is the Cyprus issue that has to be solved and the accession of Cyprus to the EU by 
2004 without the solution to the conflict between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots 
may be perceived as a threat for Turkish security and create a dispute between 
                                                                                                                                          
21 Hürriyet (daily newspaper), 29 April 2003. 
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Turkey and EU because of the existence of Turkish soldiers in the Northern Cyprus. 
In addition to this possibility, there has been going on a tense situation between 
Turkey and Greece nowadays because of the claims of Greece about Turkish F-16 
planes harassing the Greek civilian airplanes. The Greek authorities have been 
criticizing the Turkish army for this situation and they have taken this issue to the 
agenda of both EU and NATO. This situation shows that Greece-Turkey relations are 
still very fragile and there can be problems about this issue in a possible Turkish 
integration with the CFSP. 
 The accession of Turkey to the EU and to the CFSP structure has both 
advantages and disadvantages for the EU. On one hand, with its strong armed forces, 
Turkey is an important component of the European security and can contribute to the 
EU's defense capabilities with its well-trained military personnel and military 
infrastructure. In addition to these, Turkey's participation in the CFSP can also have 
an "image moderating effect"22 for the EU especially in case of a military operation 
as inclusion of a Muslim country saves the CFSP from being accused for being a 
project of the Christian civilization. On the other hand, Turkey's participation can be 
problematic mainly because of the different security understanding as explained 
above, the less importance given to non-military aspects of security by Turkey and 
the political role of the army in Turkey for being against the democratic requirements 
of the Copenhagen Criteria. 
 To conclude all these, it is possible to claim that Turkey's accession to the EU 
poses a dilemma in terms of the future character of the CFSP and the faith of the 
accession will in part be determined by the EU's institutional preference in the 
international arena. The EU's preference for being a civilian political actor or a 
                                                 
22 Taken from the speech of Ali Karaosmanoğlu in the conference held in Istanbul in June 2001 on 
European Security and Cooperation 
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military actor will have a direct effect over its relations with Turkey. So far, EU has 
been of a civilian character and for this reason it is hard to reconcile the security 
understandings and the views about the position of the army in politics of the two 
parties. If the EU goes on to prefer to be a civilian international actor and not to use 
its military capacity in solving crisis situations, Turkey is likely to remain outside of 
this body without changing its existing political structure in which the army is one of 
the major political actors. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CASES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS II: 
ALGERIA 
 
 Algeria is the country which can provide another case for analyzing the role 
of the militaries in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership with respect to the democracy 
promotion policies of the European Union. Although like Turkey, Algeria can also 
be regarded as having a politicized army, it has certain special characteristics with 
respect to this issue as a result of its specific historical experiences. In addition to 
this, because of the differences in the status of Algeria and Turkey in their relations 
with the EU, where the latter is a candidate country, while the former has an 
associate status, the role of the Algerian military has to be considered in a different 
context as the EU has different responses and policies towards the status and the 
actions of the army in Algeria when compared with the case of Turkey mainly 
because of the fact that Turkey and Algeria belong to different domains of policy 
making for the EU despite the fact that they are both the Mediterranean partners. 
 This chapter deals with the historical context and the other factors which 
made the Algerian army an important political actor, the means through which the 
army exercises its political power and with how this situation is perceived and 
responded by the European Union within the context of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership or the Barcelona Process and the interests of the individual member 
states, particularly of France who has ties to Algeria as the former colonizing power.  
 
 
 
 63 
3.1 The Historical Background of the Army-Politics Relationship in Algeria 
 Algeria has been one of the colonies of France for a long period, until 1954 
when the Revolutionary War or the War of Liberation began. The war lasted for 
eight years and in 1962, the independence of Algeria was declared. However, the 
legacy of the war of independence as well as the colonial history have shaped the 
political structure of Algeria after it gained its independence. The main legacies of 
these experiences were the supremacy of the military and the authoritarian tendencies 
in the governance. As a result of its role in the independence, army became "a 
remote, unaccountable elite group"(Entelis, Arone, 1994: 175) and it went on to 
influence and shape the political life in Algeria either by coups and overthrowing the 
presidents or by taking active roles in the political institutions and decision-making 
mechanisms. 
 One significant aspect of Algerian political system is the fact that the political 
power is concentrated in the hands of a few institutions. As John P. Entelis (1982) 
argues, "particularly significant has been the emergence of a powerful and 
interlocking technocratic system with its tripartite mobilizational, managerial and 
military components working collectively to ensure a relatively effective and 
unchallenged operation of the state" (93). In other words, Algeria is governed by a 
three-fold structure which consists of the military, the bureaucracy and the single 
party. These three institutions are dependent on each other for the continuation of the 
regime and because of the weakness of the civil society and the democratic means, 
they are able to function without being accountable to the people. Moreover, these 
three institutions share "a common socializing background" (Entelis, 1982: 93) 
because of the independence struggle during which they have all taken part. They 
share the same ideology and the outlook and this might have prevented the definition 
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of independent responsibilities and duties for the three main institutions and this 
situation enables the military to take part both in the party and in the bureaucratic 
apparatus. 
 Because of the way in which the independence struggle was led, the army and 
the party could not develop separate identities in Algeria. "The war endowed the 
army (ALN- National Liberation Army) with considerable ideological authority and 
soldiers were held up as models to be emulated. So that, while the party, FLN 
(National Liberation Front) in political platform emphasized the primacy of 'the 
political' over 'the military', this view rapidly would be contradicted by discourse and 
practice" (Malley, 1996: 127). The army could justify its presence in the political 
arena and could determine the rulers, the policies and the structure of the state 
institutions in the way that it wanted as the historical data from Algeria illustrates. 
 After Algeria became independent of France in 1962, Ahmed Ben Bella 
became the first president of the state. However, unsatisfied with his policies and 
decisions, the army overthrew Ben Bella with a coup in June 1965. He was replaced 
by Houari Boumediene who had the support of the military and the technocratic elite. 
In fact, it was this support of the two part of the three-fold state structure that made 
Boumediene the president and this proves the power of the army over the party and 
over the country. In addition to this, after the 1965 coup, the military dissolved the 
National Assembly and suspended the 1963 Constitution. The political power was 
left in the hands of the Council of Revolution which was predominantly military. 
 In 1975, with the decision of the army, the country returned to the 
constitutional system. However, the army was still represented in the assembly and 
the president was backed up by the military institutions as he was named as the 
commander in chief, the minister of security and defense and the secretary general of 
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the party in addition to being the president of the country. This shows the level of 
interdependency between the civilian political authority and the military authority 
and the inability of the civilian power to make decisions independently of the 
military influence as a result of the structure of the state apparatus and its decision 
making mechanism and this constitutes an important obstacle against the 
establishment of a democratic regime in Algeria. 
 The army's political influence can also be observed during the period when 
the president Boumediene became ill and when Chadli Benjedid was named as the 
new president in 1979 after Boumediene's death, however, during Benjedid's 
presidency between the years 1979 and 1988, there were important political 
developments in Algeria which redefined the role of the Algerian army in politics but 
before going into that, it is worth to emphasize the way in which the Algerian army 
justified its political role in the governance of the country. 
 
3.2 The Guardians of the State? 
 As mentioned earlier, the military is one of the most decisive and key elite 
groups of Algerian politics. The military has constituted a guardianship role for itself 
through the military interventions and strengthened this role through gaining 
representation in the political institutions at national and local levels. While its role 
in the revolutionary struggle gave the army a popular support and legitimized its 
presence in politics, its activities after the independence also contributed to its 
legitimacy. 
 For instance, the army took an active role in rural development projects and 
this gave them a popular support and an internal prestige. The military monopolized 
the nation's coercive instruments of force, it was some sort of a hero in the eyes of 
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the citizens because of the independence struggle, it was perceived as the establisher 
of the law and order, it possessed the special organizational and managerial skills for 
the development of society (Entelis, 1982: 96-97) and all these contributed to the 
legitimacy of the Algerian army in politics and the army was defined by the 
Algerians as "the mirror of the people, a reliable model and an example to be 
followed"(Malley, 1996: 128). 
 The Algerian army also justified the political role it has taken over by its 
internal principles. Entelis (1982) argues that the military identified itself with the 
people, the revolution, the unity of the state and the strong state structure (110) 
which were also important for the Algerian citizens and this made people feel that 
they were at the same camp with the army and this might have provided additional 
civilian support for the political actions of the Algerian army.  
 As a result of all these factors, the army was represented in the civilian 
decision-making institutions and the military strengthened its position as the third leg 
of the tripartite state structure. However, the 1980s brought a change in the strength 
and presence of the army in the political sphere under the presidency of Chadli 
Benjedid whose policies had important effects on the position of the military in 
Algeria in 1980s and 1990s up to present time. 
 
3.3 The Benjedid Period: The Reversal of the Political Power 
 The Benjedid Period (1979-1988) is significant for the political and economic 
liberalization process which led to the polarization of society (Entelis, Arone, 1994: 
184). During the 1980s, Algeria faced with the problems stemming from economic 
crisis and the rise of political Islamism and the more liberal atmosphere in the 
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country during Benjedid's presidency led to various protests and strikes of mainly 
university students, workers and Islamist groups. 
 In the October of 1988, the political climate changed significantly in Algeria. 
The violent protests of people led to the state of emergency and the use of force. The 
army suppressed the events rather harshly and the incident became known as 'the 
Black October' because of the bloody clash between the army and the people. With 
these events, the Algerian military lost its legitimacy and popular support and 
became the target of people's reactions. The role of the army was being reversed 
because president Benjedid responded to the protests with further democratization 
instead of suppressing them with the use of force. The years between 1988 and 1992 
witnessed a wave of democratization in Algeria. 
 In 1989, a new constitution was made which brought important changes to 
the way in which the state functioned, at least in principle. With the new constitution, 
the term 'socialist' in the title of the state was removed, people were given new rights 
and freedoms and there was no special emphasis on the role and importance of the 
FLN, the single party of Algeria but most importantly, with the 1989 constitution, the 
army no longer had a political status and was assigned to the duty of national defense 
(Toth, 1994: 63). In other words, under Benjedid's presidency, the army was pushed 
out of politics as a result of its response to the protests of the civilians. The army's 
"favorable image based on its role in the War of Independence and in the creation of 
Post-war Algerian state, was badly tarnished by the ruthless way in which it 
suppressed the strikes and riots of Black October" (Tortter, 1994: 255). However, the 
events following 'the Black October' and the political situation that emerged as a 
result of the democratization wave in Algeria also enabled the military to return to 
politics and to rebuild its political strength. 
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3.4 The Army Comes Back: The 1992 Coup and Its Implications 
 The re-establishment of the military power in Algerian politics after the 
political liberalization process can be linked to the foundation of the Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS) as the main opposition party against the National Liberation 
Front (FLN) and to the rise of political Islam with the FIS. The Islamic Salvation 
Front gained the support of many opposition groups and it provided a popular 
support for coming to power in the free elections. However, in 1991, the FLN made 
changes in the election system in order to protect its power after the elections and 
this led to various strikes and protests in Algeria. These strikes and protests made the 
army come out of its barracks and the state of emergency was declared in September 
1991. On the other hand, the preparations were also made for the new elections. The 
first tour of the elections was held and the possibility of the FIS coming to power 
emerged. 
 The FIS and the political Islam were perceived as threats to the state by the 
army (Willis, 1996) and they used this situation as the means to regain their political 
position. The second tour of the elections was suspended and the military coup took 
place on 11 January 1992. "As the threat of Islamic militancy became more acute, the 
power of the army re-emerged as the primary bulwark against the religiously inspired 
violence. The role of the armed forces was legitimated" (Tortter, 1994: 255) with the 
declaration of the state of emergency. People who feared the Islamist government 
supported the coup. After the coup, the political authority was transferred to the High 
Security Council which consisted of six military officers and which was soon 
replaced by the High Council of State of five members which was dominated by 
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military officers who had almost unlimited political powers (Entelis, Arone, 1994: 
189). 
 The 1992 coup reasserted the presence of the Algerian military in politics up 
until now and the army has important effects on the way in which the Algerian state 
functions and thus on the possibility of establishing democratic institutions and the 
future of democracy in Algeria. 
 The major consequence of the 1992 military intervention can be summarized 
as the reversal of the process of the reduction of the military authority with the 1989 
Constitution through usage of the security of the state. The soldiers found the rise of 
political Islam as contrary to the security of the state and the three-fold state structure 
was re-established with the army coming back to the political scene. 
 As Morgan (1994) argues, "in ousting President Benjedid, canceling 
elections, and imposing a state of emergency, the military and the military-backed 
government set in motion a sweeping reversal of the democratic drive that had been 
in motion since 1988" (81). In other words, after the 1992 coup, "the virtual 
elimination of constitutional government and the resurrection of military 
authoritarianism have returned to Algeria" (Entelis, Arone, 1994: 175) and the 
authoritarian state structure was strengthened and today, it poses a considerable 
obstacle against the establishment of democratic institutions and political 
liberalization in Algeria. 
 The long-existing ties between the Algerian army and the single party 
contribute to the military's desire to cut off the political liberalization process 
because democracy would mean for the army to lose its privileged position and to 
stay in its barracks for all the time, so in Algeria, there is a "tension between the role 
of the military and the requirements of the political and economic liberalization" 
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(Morgan, 1994: 70) which means that Algeria has a long way to go for liberalizing 
its political and economic system and this liberalization has to start with the 
elimination of the political role of the army which is not an easy task to fulfill in a 
country like Algeria. 
 During the period after the 1992 coup, the rule of law almost did not exist in 
Algeria and the state became a military autocracy with the ongoing state of 
emergency and the existing decision making institutions. For instance, the High 
Security Council of military officers provided advice on national security matters, it 
had to be asked for its advice before a war decision was made and was capable of 
shaping all state policies (Tortter, 1994: 257). This shows the level of military's 
involvement in Algerian politics. However, this does not mean that the army re-
gained the popular support it had in the early years of the independence. As Entelis 
and Arone (1994) argue, "majority of the Algerians were caught in the middle, 
distrusting the army as much as the Islamists" (190) during the coup and afterwards. 
 The Algerian case is significant in the sense that both sides of the conflict are 
perceived equally dangerous and are equally undesired by the people. People do not 
want the radical Islamists to come to power; however, they also do not want to be 
governed by a military regime. Yet, it is an undeniable fact that there is a long 
military tradition in Algerian national life and "tension, crises, resistance, dissidence 
and revolution have characterized Algeria's development" (Tortter, 1994: 250) and 
all these features of Algerian politics enabled the army to have a secure and strong 
position in the political life of Algeria. 
 All the above-mentioned historical and current context show that the rise of 
the military especially since 1990s "pose substantial challenges for Algeria's future 
development and stability because the administrative elite and top party functionaries 
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have been relegated to a subordinate position" (Entelis, Arone, 1994: 204) together 
with people and as Robert Malley (1996) argues in his book "The Call From Algeria: 
Third Worldism, Revolution and the Turn to Islam", "while most states have armies, 
Algeria's army has a state" (247) and this situation is clearly contrary to the ideal 
model of the state based on democratic principles in Europe and to the principle of 
the establishment of democratic control over the militaries, thus, it is a matter that 
concerns the European Union because of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which 
includes Algeria. The next section deals with these concerns of the EU and its 
response and approach towards the ongoing situation in Algeria. 
 
3.5 The EU's Approach to Algeria: Promotion of Democracy, the EUROMED 
and France 
 The foreign policy of the EU and its main concerns in the international arena 
are characterized by promotion of democratic principles, political stability and 
respect for human rights as well as the economic development (Roberts, 2002: 106) 
and with respect to the Mediterranean region, these concerns are put into practice 
with the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the Barcelona 
Conference in November, 1995 which has provided the official context for the EU 
policies with respect to Algeria. 
 The Southern Enlargement of the EU made the community neighbors with 
North Africa and thus with Algeria and the region became crucial for the security 
concerns of Europe. As an implication of the peace through democracy policy, the 
European Union now has an interest in the political stability of Algeria as the 
violence and political polarization in this country may become a threat for the 
European security in the future (Gillespie, Whitehead, 2002: 204). However, the 
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security matters have such priority for the EU that this may lead to leaving the 
authoritarian regimes as they are for the sake of security and stability instead of 
promoting democracy and the main reason for this is the fear of the rise of political 
Islam in a more liberal atmosphere. This situation creates doubts about the 
seriousness of the EU in the matter of promoting democracy as although "during 
1990s promoting democracy abroad was a high profile issue on the EU's foreign 
policy agenda, the significances of this particular goal diminished considerably, 
whereas other priorities such as conflict prevention and conflict management became 
the order of the day"(Olsen, 2002: 311) and this shows that the promotion of 
democracy in the world lost its priority for the EU because of the emergence of the 
other security concerns like the spread of regional conflicts, political and economic 
stability and migration. In fact, instead of being a policy priority, promotion of 
democracy became a policy instrument for the resolution of these new concerns 
which was used on occasion. As Bechir Chourou (2000) argues, "despite its 
professed claims in favor of democracy, Europe gives the impression that it does not 
wish its emergence in the South, because it suspects what the outcome would be, and 
does not want to take the risk of having its suspicion confirmed" (188).  
 As Brynjar Lia (1999) argues, the presence of authoritarian and repressive 
regimes in the Southern neighbors of the EU has security implications in the sense 
that the aims of establishing political stability, expanding economic and military 
cooperation may lead to support for the undemocratic regimes in the region (27). In 
other words, the fear of the rise of violence is crucial for the security understanding 
of Europe and the EU does not want to damage the existing status quo and prefers to 
secure its interests instead of leading a wave of democratization which is likely to 
bring political instability mainly because of the tension between the army and the 
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opposition groups. This situation gives the idea that the EU is hesitant over whether 
to promote democracy in the Mediterranean or not and behind this "lies an 
unresolved contradiction between preferences for legitimate, responsible and 
democratic government or political stability as a basis for economic development" 
(Joffe, 1994: 31) and the EU seems to prefer to preserve the status quo for the sake of 
the economic ties with the Mediterranean region. 
 Because of the colonial history, "European countries and the community bear 
some historical responsibility for the consolidation of authoritarian regimes in North 
Africa, and may thus be duty-bound to make amends. Europe did nothing to promote 
democracy as the region's regimes became consolidated after independence, and in 
more recent years the EU may be seen, in practice, as having bolstered elite 
coalitions rather than promoting political pluralism" (Gillespie, Whitehead, 2002: 
196). We can test the plausibility of this argument by looking at the actions and 
policies of the EU in order to decide on whether the EU is an effective international 
actor in Algeria or not with respect to promoting democracy and controlling the army 
through democratic means. 
 If we go back to the Barcelona Declaration which is the starting point of the 
EUROMED, we can see the stated aims of the EU as an international actor in the 
Mediterranean region within the political and security pillar of the declaration which 
states that the Mediterranean Partners have to strengthen the rule of law and 
democracy in their countries23. However, while being a member of the EUROMED, 
Algeria still suffers from the absence of the rule of law and is still not a democratic 
state and this may be considered as an indication of the failure of the EU as an 
effective international actor in Algeria. 
                                                 
23 http:// europa.eu.int/barcelona declaration 
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 As mentioned earlier, "during the 1990s, there were clear limitations on the 
European Union's policy to promote democracy in North Africa. The limits were 
mainly imposed by the high priority given to security, by the EU's institutional 
structure, and by its political bureaucratic culture" (Olsen, 2002: 316) and many 
scholars argue that "the EU is not a fully coherent and effective force in international 
affairs vis-à-vis the Mediterranean" (Stavridis, Hutchence, 2000: 36). As the 
Algerian case illustrates, the democracy promotion efforts of the EU have no tangible 
results and the authoritarian regimes go on to exist as some other factors like 
economic interests, emigration and the fear of Islamist alternatives affected the EU 
policy and limited the EU's power as a political actor in the region.  
 When the coup took place in 1992, "the essence of European discourse on 
Algeria had been the critique of the regime on democratic grounds" (Roberts, 2002: 
119). There were various resolutions and declarations emphasizing the negative 
views of Europe with respect to the undemocratic character of the Algerian regime. 
On many occasions, "the European Union re-confirmed its willingness to support a 
policy of democratic development and economic restructuring in Algeria"24. 
However, despite the declarations which condemned the political situation and 
violence, "little has been done in the way of pursuing the EU's stated aims. The EU 
has not attached any political conditionality to the aid, trade and financial relations it 
already has with Algeria" (Stavridis, Hutchence, 2000: 51). 
 The European Union did not create any pressure on Algeria for political 
liberalization. In fact, the military power was preferred over a possible FIS 
government and the EU supported the status quo instead of promoting democracy 
because the economic relations had priority and the existing trade agreements and 
                                                 
24 CFSP, Declaration on Algeria, 23 January 1995. 
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business with Algeria were not used as instruments for pushing economic and 
political liberalization. These relations were not conditional on the development of 
human rights and democracy in Algeria. On the contrary, despite the existence of the 
authoritarian regime and the internal violence, the negotiations for the association 
agreement were carried on between the EU and Algeria, were concluded in 2001 and 
finally the agreement was signed in Valencia, in April, 2002 whose principles were 
based on the economic concerns with no mentioning of promotion of human rights 
and democracy.25 
 While analyzing the EU policies towards Algeria, one important factor that 
has to be taken into account is the influence of France. Having colonial ties with the 
region and having governed Algeria for a long time, made France some sort of an 
expert in the EU in the formulation of the policies about Algeria and France played a 
significant role in shaping the attitude of the EU towards this country. 
 After the coup in 1992, France supported the military as a power against the 
threat of religious fundamentalism (Ciment, 1997: 124) and this led to the 
undermining of promotion of democracy in Algeria by the EU. In other words, the 
security concerns and the threat perceptions of France in a way became the security 
concerns of the EU and they shaped the community policy. It was France who 
defined the nature of the problem in Algeria as it was perceived as the only foreign 
country to understand the situation in Algeria (Roberts, 2002: 127). As a result, it can 
be argued that the European Union failed to develop a policy that reflects the 
concerns and interests of all of its members in Algeria and the discourse was 
dominated by the interests of France. 
                                                 
25 http://europa.eu.int/comm/externalrelations/algeria/docs/index.htm 
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 While criticizing the lack of effectiveness of the EU as an international actor 
in Algeria and in North Africa, in general, we should also consider the status of the 
region in its relations with the EU which determine the methods and sanctions 
available for the EU to promote democracy. In its previous experiences of Southern 
Enlargement (and also the Eastern Enlargement), EU had the advantageous position 
because the issue was the accession of the countries that had the problems of 
democratization. The desire of these countries- Greece, Spain, Portugal- to join the 
Community provided them an incentive for making reforms of democratization. On 
the other hand, there is no such incentive for Algeria because of the experience of 
Morocco who applied for the EC membership in 1987 and was denied. With this 
case, the EC had determined its geographical boundaries, so currently, there is no 
such incentive of membership for the democratization of Algeria. However, there are 
still the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Barcelona Declaration which can 
provide the framework for the EU to promote democracy in Algeria. 
 Barcelona Declaration provides the instrument for the EU to encourage 
democracy and "the bilateral trade area agreements have requirements for democratic 
governments and respect for human rights [but] these are usually treated as 
formalities by both parties to the agreement" (Joffe, 1997: 20). As a result, the EU 
fails to be effective in promoting democracy and establishing the democratic control 
of the military in Algeria. There are some declarations which state the EU's concerns 
about the situation in Algeria but there are no coercive actions. There is no serious 
policy of the EU to promote democracy in Algeria. For instance, the EU has not 
called for "the executive branch of the state to be accountable to legislature, the army 
to withdraw from political sphere, the judiciary to be independent of executive, the 
proper measures to be taken for fair elections" [and never mentioned the existence 
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of] "the state of emergency and the weakness of civil society" (Roberts, 2002: 127) 
in Algeria which are the crucial aspects of a well-functioning and stable democracy. 
For the EU, in Algeria, the economic interests have priority and the Community 
prefers to preserve the status quo by supporting the undemocratic regime. 
 
3.6 The Implications of the CFSP in the Algerian Case 
The Algerian case is different from that of Turkey because of its different 
status with respect to the EU as for being a candidate country, Turkey has to fulfill 
strict political criteria and receives severe criticisms for the political role of its army 
while Algeria, as a trading partner and as a part of the foreign policy of the EU, feels 
the political pressure less despite the military coup and the state of emergency 
because of its economic ties with the EU. However, as "the stability of North Africa 
is of strategic importance to Europe, particularly Southern Europe" (De Vasconcelos, 
1988: 145), possible security challenges coming from Algeria are taken seriously by 
the EU and these challenges contribute to the adjustment problems for the future of 
the EU-Algeria relations. 
It is important to note that the security problems with Algeria form the non-
military aspect of the CFSP because the economic interests of the EU provide the 
basic motive for the relations with Algeria together with the ties of France to this 
country. For this reason, the political instability in Algeria may create a problem in 
the future when it begins to threaten the economic interests of the EU.  
 The mass migration from Algeria to the EU countries is a major adjustment 
problem because the immigrants have entered the economic systems of the European 
countries during a time of recession and this led to the revival of racism and 
xenophobia as the Europeans felt that their jobs and well-being were threatened by 
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these immigrants and this led to the rise of the right-wing parties (Calabrese, 1997: 
92) which created the possibility of political instability within the territories of the 
EU. For these reasons, the EU feels the need to preserve the stability in Algeria (and 
in North Africa generally) in order to preserve its own stability as it is believed that if 
there exists no political instability in the North African countries, then there will be 
no migration to Europe. In addition to the mass migration problem, the extreme 
nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism in relation to terrorism in Algeria create 
potential threats for Europe and the EU tends to support the regime which is capable 
of dealing with these problems which does not necessarily have to be democratic. 
 Algeria is an interesting case in terms of testing the effectiveness of the CFSP 
because it creates dilemmas for the security understanding of the EU. On one hand, 
the threats of mass migration, nationalism, religious fundamentalism and terrorism 
require the EU to preserve the status quo in Algeria in which military seems to have 
established political control because of the EU's concerns of domestic political 
stability and economic interests. On the other hand, the desire to preserve the status 
quo contradicts with the promotion of democracy principle of the CFSP because in 
Algeria, democracy tends to create chaos which poses threats over European security 
and for this reason, the EU members refrain from pursuing policies of promoting 
democracy in Algeria. 
 As Antonio Marquina (1988) suggests, although the Algerians accept the role 
played by the EU in the Mediterranean region, they do not want to feel obliged to 
follow its directives in their domestic affairs (179) and this shows that the EU has no 
politically binding power over Algeria in terms of the promotion of democracy 
because of its economic interests and the risk of chaos coming with the wave of 
democratization. 
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 In sum, it is possible to argue that Algeria is another example of the civilian 
character of the CFSP of the EU as it reflects the broad security understanding in 
Europe which includes non-military threats and it demonstrates that the economic 
interests of the EU are crucial in shaping the European reaction to domestic 
instability in the strategic regions but most importantly, it reveals the fact that the 
promotion of democracy is not always the basic principle of the CFSP as sometimes, 
for the sake of political and economic stability and for the sake of the other aspects 
of security, it can be victimized as in the case of Algeria.  
In the light of all these factors, we can regard Algeria as a failure of the EU as 
an international actor in the Mediterranean region. The European Union has failed to 
put the principles of the Barcelona Declaration into practice in the Algerian case and 
this shows that "there is still a long way to go before the Union can be seen as a 
coherent international force in the Euro- Mediterranean area" (Stavridis, Hutchence, 
2000: 42). 
 
3.7 Turkey and Algeria: A Brief Comparison 
 Turkey and Algeria are two Mediterranean Partners whose militaries are an 
important actor in their political life. While the initial legitimizing process for this 
situation is similar in both countries, as the two cases show, there are important 
differences in the way in which the Turkish army and the Algerian army use their 
political power. In addition to that, because their status are different in their relations 
to the Community, the EU has different policies and reactions towards the political 
role of the Turkish military and towards that of the Algerian military. 
 In both countries, the underlying reason of the political power of the army is 
their struggles for independence which are the Turkish War of Independence and 
 80 
Algeria's Revolutionary War against French colonization. In both cases, when the 
struggle ended with victory, army got an important position in the society because of 
their success and this position enabled the officers to take part in the state-building 
process after the war. In Turkey, the army was the founder and the modernizer of the 
new Turkish state and in Algeria; it became one leg of the three-fold state structure 
and governed the country together with the single party and the bureaucratic 
apparatus. In Turkey and also in Algeria, the historical background of the country 
enabled the military to engage in politics with a legitimate claim to political power. 
However, there are some differences in the way in which the Turkish army and the 
Algerian army use this power. 
 The armies of these two countries both assume the role of the guardian of the 
regime and they have intervened to the political life whenever they thought that the 
existence of the regime and the security of the country were in danger. However, 
while the Turkish military never intended to establish an authoritarian regime and 
preferred to leave the political scene and to take part in politics through less direct 
means, the Algerian army created a military regime after the 1992 coup and 
continues to govern the country through authoritarian means. 
 The Turkish army stated that it planned to return to civil political life and to 
rebuild democracy as soon as the order was restored. On the other hand, the Algerian 
army's intention was to come to power and it never planned to leave the office to the 
civilians and this closed the possible channels of democratization in Algeria, 
especially after the 1992 coup. 
 When it comes to the relationships of the two countries with the EU, there are 
important differences in terms of the demands and policies of the Union concerning 
the promotion of democracy. The European Union prepares progress reports and 
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makes statements about the level of democratization in Turkey and the political role 
of the Turkish army is brought up as one of the problems with the Turkish 
democracy. As Turkey is one of the candidate countries for the EU membership, it is 
expected to fulfill certain conditions for being a part of the Union and diminishing 
the political role of the army is one of these conditions. 
 On the other hand, Algeria is a Mediterranean Partner who is tied to the 
Union mainly through economic relationships. In the Algerian case, the EU does not 
use any sanctions or push for democratization reforms through the suspension of the 
relationships because it also has interests in these relations as well as Algeria. In 
other words, the trade bonds with Algeria are not sacrificed for the sake of 
democracy and the EU fails as an international actor who promotes democracy in 
Algeria. 
 The brief comparison of the Turkish and Algerian cases shows that the 
promotion of democracy is important for the EU only when it directly affects the 
community. The policy of promoting democracy is a domestic policy tool for the EU 
rather than being a foreign policy objective. The members of the Union are expected 
to have well-functioning democratic systems because of the idea that a problem in 
one member country can affect the whole community but when it comes to the 
associates or the trade partners like Algeria, promotion of democracy becomes of 
secondary importance and it is used as a policy tool when it is seen as necessary for 
the economic interests of the EU. As a candidate country, Turkey belongs to the 
domestic concerns of the EU while Algeria is a part of international security interests 
of the Union. The priority of economic interests and the fact that the two countries 
belong to different areas of policy making explain why the military regime in Algeria 
is not challenged by the EU while the Turkish democracy is highly criticized for 
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giving too much political power to the army and for the lack of democratic control 
over its armed forces. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This thesis has made an analysis of the EU's Mediterranean policy within the 
context of EUROMED and the effects of the political role of the militaries over this 
policy in the context of the democratization principles of the EU by evaluating the 
influence of the Turkish and Algerian armed forces over the relations of these 
countries with the EU and certain conclusions were drawn from these analysis. 
 First of all, the analysis of the CFSP and the foundation principles of the EU 
shows that the promotion of democracy in the world is a strategy of security for the 
EU which has been used in the Union's foreign policy whenever it was felt 
necessary. A closer look at the EU history and structure has shown that the initial 
democratic cooperation among the European states had served for the function of a 
deeper integration at the political level and in the EU democracy became a rule of 
conduct and a criterion especially in the domestic matters of the Union.  
 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership provides a good case of study for 
analyzing the implications of the democracy promotion policy of the EU. The basic 
premises of the Mediterranean policy of the Community were shaped by the aim of 
democratization of the region as the analysis of the accession processes of Greece, 
Spain and Portugal have revealed and this aim reflects itself in the principles of the 
EUROMED, too. 
 The study of the EUROMED showed that the EU has some concerns about 
the peace and stability of the Mediterranean region and sees the lack of 
democratization as a source of the problems in the region. Thus, under the 
EUROMED framework, the EU has been trying to promote democracy by setting 
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certain principles. One aspect of these principles is controlling the militaries through 
democratic means and limiting the influence of the army in politics. 
 The study of Turkey and Algeria has helped to clarify 'the problem of the 
militaries' in the EUROMED and the two cases revealed the fact that the different 
security understandings, different threat perceptions and different duties assigned for 
the militaries exist in the EU and the Mediterranean Partners which result from 
different historical experiences and internal dynamics and that the political role of 
the militaries is likely to remain as an important problem in the future of the EU- 
Mediterranean relations. 
 However, the main conclusion that can be derived from the comparison of the 
Turkish and Algerian cases in terms of the EU's responses towards the political 
influence of the military is the fact that the EU is not that consistent about the 
promotion of democracy as a foreign policy and although democracy is an important 
pre-condition of both membership and partnership, it is possible to observe some 
flexibilities in this policy. While in the Turkish case, the political weight of the 
military is seen as an important obstacle against democratization and accession to the 
EU, in the Algerian case, although there is no democratic regime and the military 
rules the country, the EU does not use the sanctions stated in the Barcelona 
Declaration in order to promote democracy in Algeria and the basic reasons for this 
situation are the economic relations between the EU and Algeria and the danger of 
religious fundamentalism which can arise under a democratic system. 
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